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Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, Catalina Worthing Insurance Ltd f/k/a HFPI (as
Part VII transferee of Excess Insurance Company Ltd. and London & Edinburgh Insurance
Company Ltd.), RiverStone Insurance (UK) Ltd. (as successor in interest to Terra Nova Insurance
Company Ltd), and Sompo Japan Nipponkoa Insurance Company of Europe Limited (f/k/a/ The
Yasuda Fire & Marine Insurance Company of Europe Ltd.) (collectively “London Market
Insurers” or “LMI”), who subscribed, severally and not jointly, as their interests appear, to
Package, Excess Umbrella and Excess Broadform (“High Layer Excess”), and other Policies
providing insurance (“LMI Policies”) to The Diocese of Camden, New Jersey (“Debtor”) and
non-debtor diocesan related entities (collectively, “Related Entities” and with the Debtor,
“Assureds”), by and through their undersigned counsel, submit this trial brief in further support
of the Debtor’s Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement of Controversy by and Among
the Debtor and the Settling Insurers pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019, filed January 2, 2022,
Dkt. 1087 (“Original 9019 Motion”)1, as supplemented on February 2, 2022, Dkt. 1144 (“9019
Supplement” and, together with the Original 9019 Motion and all exhibits attached to each, “9019
Motion”) 2.

1

Attached to the 9019 Motion is the Declaration of Allen Wilen, CPA in Support of Debtor’s
Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement of Controversy by and Among the Debtor and
the Settling Insurers pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019 (“Wilen Dec.”). See Dkt. 1087-3

2

“Certain Settling Insurers” include LMI, Century Indemnity Company, as successor to CCI
Insurance Company, as successor to Insurance Company of North America (“Century”), Granite
State Insurance Company (“Granite State”), Lexington Insurance Company (“Lexington”),
National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA (“National Union” and, together with
Granite State and Lexington, collectively, the “AIG Insurers”), and National Catholic Risk
Retention Group, Inc. (“National Catholic Risk Retention”).

1
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INTRODUCTION.3
The 9019 Motion seeks approval of a Settlement Agreement and Release by and among

the Assureds and the Certain Settling Insurers (“Settlement Agreement”).4

The Settlement

Agreement is attached as Exhibit A to the 9019 Supplement. See Dkt. 1144. If approved, the
Settlement Agreement requires the Certain Settling Insurers to pay, in the aggregate, $30 million
(“Insurance Contribution”)5 to a trust (“Trust”) for the benefit of claimants (“POC Abuse
Claimants”) who filed childhood sexual abuse Proofs of Claim (“POC Abuse Claims”) against the
Debtor in this case. The Trust into which the Insurance Contribution will be deposited is to be
established pursuant to a Plan of Reorganization supported by the Certain Settling Insurers
(“Insurer Supported Plan”).

The Insurer Supported Plan contemplated by the Settlement

Agreement is the Fifth Amended Chapter 11 Plan Proposed by the Debtor-in-Possession [Dkt.
1394], including any subsequent amendments, as more fully described in the Fifth Amended
Disclosure Statement Pursuant to Section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code Describing Second

Any citation or reference to “IE” is to the Diocese’s and Insurers’ Combined Exhibit List
prepared in connection with the 9019 Motion and provided to the Tort Committee on April 11,
2022 in accordance with the applicable scheduling order. That exhibit list was not filed with the
court due to the Debtor’s repudiation of the Insurance Settlement. However, that exhibit list will
be supplemented with all Plan Confirmation related exhibits and filed with the court prior to the
Combined Hearing. If for some reason the exhibit references change, LMI will update this Trial
Brief to reflect the new exhibit references.

3

4

In addition to this Trial Brief, on March 7, 2022, LMI filed an Amended Memorandum in
Support of Debtor’s Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement of Controversy By and
Among the Diocese and the Settling Insurers Pursuant to Rule 9019 [Dkt. 1294] (“LMI Memo in
Support of 9019 Motion”). IE at 0092.
5

The Insurance Contribution comprises: $10,230,822.12 from LMI; $12,987,274.80 from
Interstate; $4,711,298.62 from Century Indemnity; $1,850,000 from National Catholic; and
$220,604.46 from Granite State/Lexington. Dkt. 1144, at 2-3, paras. 2-7; Dkt. 1142, at 11-12.

2
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Amended Chapter 11 Plan Proposed by the Debtor-in-Possession [Dkt. 1393] (“Disclosure
Statement for Fifth Amended Plan”).6
In addition to the $30 million Insurance Contribution, pursuant to the Settlement
Agreement, the Trust will be funded with $50 million from the Debtor and $10 million from the
Related Entities (each such payment a “Settlement Amount”), for a total of $90 million. Disclosure
Statement for Fifth Amended Plan at 3-4, 73-74 and 83. A $90 million contribution to the Trust
Settlement Amount reflects a per claim payment for each POC Abuse Claim significantly
exceeding what the Debtor paid to settle such claims in the past, more than 2.6 times those
amounts. Id. at 35-37.
The Settlement Agreement merits approval under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure
(“Bankruptcy Rule”) 9019 because it is fair and equitable; it satisfies the applicable factors set
forth in In re Martin, 91 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Martin Factors”); and it satisfies the
requirements of Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.
The Settlement Agreement is fair and equitable because, amongst other reasons, LMI and
the Debtor have significant liability and coverage defenses to the POC Abuse Claims. For the
majority of the POC Abuse Claims within LMI’s years of coverage, LMI would likely have no
indemnity liability, or would be required to indemnify the Debtor for only a fraction of the values
that the POC Abuse Claimants would assert. In addition, many of the POC Abuse Claims fail to

6

As the Court is aware, and as discussed below, the Debtor has abandoned the Insurer
Supported Plan in favor of The Eighth Amended Plan of Reorganization (“Eighth Amended
Plan”), which the Debtor has solicited and is scheduled for a confirmation hearing commencing
on October 6, 2022, concurrently with the contested hearing on the 9019 Motion. The Eighth
Amended Plan does not provide for the Settlement Agreement, does not contain terms required by
the Settlement Agreement, and is not supported by LMI.
3
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allege facts indicating that the Debtor may have any liability, or allege liability on the part of
entities not insured under the LMI Policies. See Section III.A.1., infra.
In addition to liability and coverage defenses to the POC Abuse Claims, when the Assureds
purchased the LMI Policies, they agreed to defend all such claims in the tort system; LMI have no
duty to defend. Furthermore, the LMI Policies sit above Self-Insured Retentions (“SIRs”) pursuant
to which the Assureds are obligated to pay (typically) the first $75,000 of every claim.7
The Settlement Agreement is also fair and equitable because, amongst other reasons, the
“Adversary Proceeding” (defined below) would be a time-consuming and expensive litigation for
all parties thereto, potentially imposing years of delay and costs of millions of dollars in legal fees.
See Section III.A.3, infra. That money would go to lawyers, not POC Abuse Claimants.
Approval of the Settlement Agreement serves the interests of the POC Abuse Claimants,
because it facilitates establishment of the Trust for the payment of POC Abuse Claims, and avoids
diminution of the funds in the Trust caused by the defense of claims in the tort system and the
application of the SIRs. In addition to such tangible benefits, intangible benefits to POC Abuse
Claimants include the avoidance of (i) litigation in the tort system; (ii) uncertainty about the
outcome of tort litigation and coverage litigation; (iii) delays in payment inherent in tort litigation;
and (v) loss of privacy. See Section III.A.4, infra. Approval of the Settlement Agreement will

7

See, e.g., Deposition of Thomas Baker, (“Baker Depo.”), Exhibit 3, Package Policy No. SL
3081/SLC 5088; IE at 0064, which states “Part II (Specific Excess Agreement) Limits of Liability:
The Underwriters’ Limits of Liability under this Agreement shall be only for the excess of loss
over $75,000, ultimate net loss each and every loss and/or occurrence . . .” (p. 16 of 33), and “[i]n
calculating the amount of Ultimate Net Loss under . . . Part II (Specific Excess Agreement) this
Insurance is deemed to have the following maximum limits which will apply for all purposes to
the Assured’s Loss Fund and the Specific Excess Agreement: . . . (b) $200,000 any one occurrence
Combined Single Limit Public Liability/Property Damage under Section II . . ..” (p. 18 of 33). In
the same Policy, LMI’ responsibility is expressed as “Hereon: 90% of 100% of Limits and
Premium”.
4
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also pave the way for the Debtor to proceed to plan confirmation with an Insurer Supported Plan,
which will ultimately result in the Debtor’s trade creditors and POC Abuse Claimants receiving a
substantial distribution years earlier than if the POC Abuse Claims were adjudicated through
litigation. Id.
The Settlement Agreement merits approval under Sections 363(b), (f), and (m) of the
Bankruptcy Code. The Debtor’s entry into the Settlement Agreement is a reasonable exercise of
its business judgment. Approval of the Settlement Agreement allows the Debtor to forego
spending substantial funds litigating the Adversary Proceeding, which can be used to pay POC
Abuse Claims several years sooner than would be possible if the Adversary Proceeding were
litigated to judgment. Substantial uncertainty as to whether, and to what extent, LMI may cover
POC Abuse Claims will be avoided. The Debtor’s liability to POC Abuse Claimants can be
resolved now, rather than years into the future when liability and coverage defenses are eventually
litigated in multiple lawsuits. See Section III.B., infra.
The proposed sale of the “Subject Insurance Policies”8 included in the Settlement
Agreement constitutes a good faith, arm’s length transaction, which is the product of months of
mediation between the Assureds, and the Certain Settling Insurers (collectively, “Settling Parties”)
before the Honorable Jose L. Linares.9
The Debtor provided adequate and reasonable notice of (a) the time to object and (b) the
hearing to consider the 9019 Motion and Settlement Agreement. Notice by mail was sent to all

8

The Settlement Agreement defines “Subject Insurance Policies” as, collectively, the
Interstate Insurance Policies, the LMI Insurance Policies, the National Catholic Insurance Policies,
the AIG Insurers’ Insurance Policies, and the Century Insurers Insurance Policies. Each included
term shall take the meaning ascribed in the Settlement Agreement.

9

The Official Committee of Tort Claimant Creditors refused to participate in mediation with
the Certain Settling Insurers in any meaningful way.
5
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known creditors and notice by publication was provided to ensure notice to any unknown creditors.
See Section III.B.3, infra. See Affidavit of Service, Doc, 1246 (serving notice of the 9019 Motion);
Affidavit of Publication, Doc. 1329 (verifying that the 9019 Motion was sent for publication).
The Settlement Agreement is consistent, and is designed to work, with the Insurer
Supported Plan. The Settlement Agreement provides for the full payment by the Certain Settling
Insurers, within sixty days of the confirmation order becoming final. See Settlement Agreement
at 16, 31.
However, the Debtor now seeks to confirm the Eighth Amended Plan of Reorganization
[Dkt. 1725] (“Eighth Amended Plan”). The Eighth Amended Plan calls for the Debtor to make
payments over four years. See id. at 23. Further, the Assureds’ $87.5 million dollar contribution
is subject to the Certain Settling Insurers’ Administrative Expense Claim, which, as the Court
acknowledged at the September 21 hearing, includes consequential damages should the Court not
approve the Settlement Agreement. Moreover, if the Court does not approve the Settlement
Agreement, the Trust would have to use that $87.5 million to pay tens millions of dollars to (i)
insurance coverage lawyers, should the Trust seek insurance coverage from the Certain Settling
Insurers for the POC Abuse Claims; (ii) defense lawyers, to defend the POC Abuse Claims which
is a necessary, but insufficient in and of itself, prerequisite to obtaining insurance coverage; and
(iii) cover the Self-Insured Retentions (“SIRs”) under the Debtor’s insurance policies, rather than
pay those tens of millions of dollars to POC Abuse Claimants.
Considering the time it would take to resolve the litigation over the Assureds’ liability for
abuse, and appeals, and the insurance coverage therefor, and appeal, the time value of money, and
the costs to the Debtor for the Administrative Expense Claim, the POC Abuse Claimants would
be far better off were the Court to approve the Settlement Agreement.
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RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND.
A.

The LMI Policies.

The Assureds were self-insured starting in 1972 under the Gallagher Bishop’s Plan
(“Bishop’s Plan”) for property, auto, workers compensation, and liability claims.10 Under the
Bishop’s Plan, the Debtor purchased excess indemnity coverage from LMI and others from 1972
to at least 1985. See “LMI Policies” (as defined below). The Debtor retained the obligation to
defend and administer claims, but, as a condition to coverage, was required to use a Service
Organization or Third Party Administrator (“TPA”), at all times, to furnish claims records and
reports to the excess insurers, and to provide LMI with the right to associate in the defense of
claims, which is a contractual condition to coverage under the LMI Policies. See Amended
Declaration of Catalina Sugayan in Support of Debtor’s Motion for Entry of an Order Approving
Settlement of Controversy By and Among the Diocese and the Settling Insurers Pursuant to Fed.
R. Bankr. P. 9019, Doc. 1293, Filed March 7, 2022 (“Sugayan Dec.”), Exh. 4, Package Policy Nos.
SL 3759/SCL 5778, effective November 27, 1980, to November 27, 1983 (“1980-83 Policy”), at
22-23. Pursuant to the 1980-83 Policy, the Assured would defend each childhood sexual abuse
claim (“Abuse Claim”) in the tort system or settle, paying the “Ultimate Net Loss” (or “UNL”)
incurred in connection with the Abuse Claim, which included the costs of defense and any loss
payment. Then, if the LMI Policies covered such Abuse Claim, LMI would reimburse, or
indemnify, the Assured LMI’s solvent share of the UNL, less the amount of any applicable SIRs,
which was either $50,000 or $75,000, depending on the applicable policy period. Sugayan Dec.

10

See
https://www.referenceforbusiness.com/history/Al-Be/Arthur-J-Gallagher-Co.html;
Declaration of Laura J. Montgomery Regarding the Diocese’s Assets and Operations and In
Support of the Chapter 11 Petition and First Day Pleadings (“Montgomery Declaration”), Doc. 4,
Filed 10/01/20, ¶¶82-106.
7
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¶¶4-8, Exhibits 1-5. This structure permitted the Assureds to defend claims themselves, without
the involvement of a primary insurer, which was possibly more efficient, and typically generated
less publicity. Also, if there were settlements in amounts less than the applicable SIRs, then LMI
would not have been involved, at all. Even if settlements exceeded the SIRs, the Debtor could
have paid the full amounts itself, without notifying LMI or implicating LMI’s coverage. Thus, the
Debtor’s obligation to defend Abuse Claims was a knowing, deliberate decision it made in its own
self-interest.
LMI subscribed Combined Property, Casualty and Crime Insurance Policies (“Package
Policies”), on behalf of the Assureds effective from November 27, 1972, to November 27, 1986,
that provided General Liability Coverage on an “occurrence” basis, with limits of 75% to 90% of
typically $125,000 Ultimate Net Loss (“UNL”) excess of a $75,000 UNL each occurrence SIR.
See Sugayan Dec., ¶¶4-8, Exhibits 1-5;, Deposition Transcript of Professor Thomas Baker (“Baker
Depo.”), Exhibit 3. The Package Policy effective from November 27, 1985, to November 27,
1986, contains a Sexual Misconduct Exclusion. Id. at ¶8, Exhibit 5. LMI also subscribed High
Layer Excess Policies, on behalf of the Debtor and certain related entities, effective from
November 27, 1972, to November 27, 1985, which provided General Liability Coverage on an
occurrence basis excess of $5,000,000 per occurrence underlying insurance (the SIR, the Package
Policy layer, and a $4,800,000 layer provided by other insurers). Id. at ¶¶10-17, Exhibits 7-14.11

11

LMI also subscribed a Package Policy and a High Layer Excess Policy, both effective from
November 27, 1986, to November 27, 1987, that provided General Liability Coverage on a claims
made basis, and both were endorsed with a Sexual Misconduct Exclusion. See Sugayan Dec. at ¶¶
9- 18, Exhibits 6-15.
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The Package Policies have several conditions precedent to coverage. The Service
Organization requirement provides:
V.

SERVICE ORGANIZATION:

Insurance afforded under this Insurance is issued to the Assured on the express
condition that the Assured undertakes to utilize at all times the services of Gallagher
Bassett Insurance Service12 . . . This Service Organization shall perform the
following duties:
(a) Strictly discharge the Assured's obligation to the employees or members of the
public.
(b) Maintenance of accurate records of all details incident to payments.
(c) Furnish inspection and safety engineering service.
(d) Furnish monthly claims records on an approved form.
The acceptance of these services shall be a condition precedent to any liability
which may attach to the Underwriters in accordance with the terms and conditions
of this Insurance.
See e.g. 1980-83 Policy at 22-23.
The Section II Conditions to coverage include, in pertinent part:
2. NOTICE OF OCCURRENCE:
Whenever the Assured has information from which the Assured may reasonably
conclude that an occurrence covered under Section II of this Insurance involves
injuries or damages, notice shall be given to Gallagher Bassett Insurance Service,
Gould Center, Golf Road, Rolling Meadows, Illinois 60008 as soon as practicable.
Claims shall not be prejudiced if the Assured, through clerical oversight or error,
fails to notify the above firm of any such occurrence.…
4. SELF-INSURERS STATUS:
The Assured agrees to duly qualify as a self-insurer by compliance with the
provisions of the Worker's Compensation and/or Occupational Disease Law
respecting Self-Insurance in the State of New Jersey and shall continue to maintain
12

Porter & Curtis, LLC and Sphere Risk Partners assumed the roles of Broker and Service
Organization from Arthur J. Gallagher and Gallagher Bassett Services, respectively, under the
Debtor’s self-insurance program. See Montgomery Declaration, Doc. 4, Filed October 1, 2020,
¶¶87-106. Sphere Risk Partners “as a third-party administrator”, continues to “manage claims for
all coverages . . . except for worker’s compensation”. Id. at ¶87.
9
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said status throughout the period of this Insurance, provided, however,
Underwriters shall not be relieved of their obligations hereunder because of a
breach of this condition until (1) the Assured becomes insured with respect to his
Worker's Compensation and/or Occupational Disease liability or (2) the expiration
of a period of thirty days after date of the notice served upon the Assured by the
Industrial Commission terminating his status as a self-insurer, whichever occurs
first.
Id. at 29.
The Package Policies are also subject to the following General Conditions:
INSPECTIONS, AUDIT AND VERIFICATION OF VALUES:
The Underwriters or their duly authorized representatives shall be permitted at all
reasonable times during continuance of this Insurance to inspect the premises used
by the Assured and to examine the Assured's books or records so far as they relate
to coverage afforded by this Insurance.
RECORDS:
It is hereby understood and agreed that the records and books as kept by the Assured
shall be acceptable to Underwriters in determining the amount of loss or damage
covered hereunder.
Id. at 33.
CLAIMS:
The Assured shall immediately notify Underwriters through [Gallagher/ Porter &
Curtis] of any occurrence, the cost of which is likely to result in payment by the
Underwriters under this Insurance. Underwriters shall have the opportunity to be
associated with the Assured in defense of any claims, suits, or proceedings relative
to an occurrence wherein the opinion of the Underwriters, their liability under this
Insurance is likely to be involved, in which case the Assured and Underwriters shall
cooperate to the mutual advantage of both.
Id. at 35.
LOSS PAYMENTS:
When it has been determined that Underwriters are liable under this Insurance,
Underwriters shall thereafter promptly reimburse the Assured for all payments
made in excess of the amounts stated in Subparagraphs A and B of the Limits
Agreement. All adjusted claims shall be paid or made good to the Assured within
thirty days after their presentation to [Gallagher/ Porter & Curtis], and acceptance
by Underwriters of satisfactory proof of interest and loss.
10
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Id. Thus, the LMI Policies specify that LMI shall reimburse the Assureds for “payments made”,
and pay only “adjusted claims”.
APPEAL:
In the event the Assured and Underwriters are unable to agree to the advisability of
appealing a judgment, a disinterested attorney, mutually agreeable to Underwriters
and the Assured, shall be retained and directed to render a written opinion as to his
recommendation concerning such appear. Such written recommendation shall be
binding on both the Assured and Underwriters. Fees of such retained attorney shall
be borne equally by both parties for the services of rendering his recommendation
only. The Assured's portion of such fee shall not accrue in the aggregate loss fund.
Id.
SUBROGATION:
The Underwriters shall be subrogated to all rights which the Assured may have
against any person or other entity in respect to any claim or payment made under this
Insurance, and the Assured shall execute all papers required by the Underwriters and
shall cooperate with the Underwriters to secure Underwriter's rights. . . .
Id. at 36.
The LMI Policies include the following consent-to-assignment (“Consent to Assignment”)
provision:
ASSIGNMENT:
Assignment of interest, under this Insurance shall not bind the Underwriters until the
Underwriters' consent is endorsed hereon.
Id.
CHANGES:
By acceptance of this Insurance the Assured agrees that it embodies all agreements
existing between the Assured and Underwriters or any of its agents relating to this
Insurance. None of the provisions, conditions or other terms of this Insurance shall be
waived or altered except by endorsement; nor shall notice to any agent or knowledge
possessed by any agent or by any other person be held to effect a waiver or change in
any part of this Insurance.…
FRAUDULENT CLAIMS:

11
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If the Assured shall make any claim knowing the same to be false or fraudulent, as
regards amount or otherwise, this Insurance shall become void and all claims
hereunder shall be forfeited.
Id. at 33-37.
In addition to the above-referenced conditions precedent imposed on the Debtor, each of
which is material, LMI’s obligations are set forth in (and no broader than) the General Liability
Insuring Agreement and its applicable terms and conditions. Agreement C– General Liability
Insuring Agreement provides:
Underwriters hereby agree, subject to the limitations, terms and conditions
hereunder mentioned, to indemnify the Assured for all sums which the Assured
shall be obligated to pay by reason of the liability imposed upon the Assured by
law or assumed by the Named Assured under contract or agreement, for damages
direct or consequential, and expenses, all as more fully defined by the term
“ultimate net loss,” on account of personal injuries . . . arising out of any occurrence
happening during the period of Insurance.
Id. at 26.
The term “Ultimate Net Loss” is defined as follows:
[T]he total sum which the Assured becomes obligated to pay by reason of personal
injury or property damage claims, either through adjudication or compromise, after
making proper deductions for all recoveries and salvages, and shall also include . .
. expenses for doctors, lawyers, nurses, . . . and for litigation . . . which are paid as
a consequence of any occurrence covered hereunder…. Fees, charges and expenses
for [the Service Organization] are specifically excluded, and are to be paid by the
Assured (emphasis added).
Id. at 28 (emphasis added).
The Package Policies provide indemnity coverage for Ultimate Net Loss incurred for
Personal Injury claims arising from an Occurrence only where there is legal liability for damages
and expenses that has been either “imposed upon the Assured by law” or “assumed by the Named
Assured under contract or agreement”. Amounts paid, or which an Assured agreed to be paid,
where there is no showing that the Assured has legal liability, would not be covered. Thus,

12
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pursuant to the above-quoted policy provision, the Debtor, as a self-insurer, and as material
conditions precedent in the Package Policies, must:
(i) defend;
(ii) notify;
(iii) utilize at all times a Service Organization;
(iv) provide LMI with records,
(v) cooperate with LMI;
(vi) permit LMI to be associated in the defense of claims;
(vii) not assign interests under the LMI Policies without LMI’s consent;
(viii) make no changes to the agreements except by endorsement; and
(ix) not make false or fraudulent claims.
Id.
B.

The Debtor’s Claims History.

Pursuant to the Bishop’s Plan, the Assureds administered, defended, and settled liability
claims. See Section II.A, supra. The Assureds procured excess indemnity insurance coverage
from LMI and other insurers to reimburse them for UNL in excess of their self-insured retentions
for covered claims. See, e.g. Baker Dep.., Exhibit 3; IE at 0064.
Many individuals have asserted childhood sexual abuse claims against the Assureds over
the years, including claims brought long after the abuse happened, as New Jersey has historically
permitted late-filed claims based on its “Discovery Rule”. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:61B-1(b);
Lopez v. Swyer, 62 J.J. 269 (N.J. 1973); Bryson v. Diocese of Camden, 909 F. Supp. 2d 364, 372
(D.N.J. 2012). From 1990 to 2019, the Debtor paid 99 settlements to Abuse Claimants totaling
approximately $10,120,000, for an average per claim payment of $102,222. See Disclosure
Statement for Fifth Amended Plan at 43; IE at 1047.

13
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The Assureds requested LMI to provide indemnity reimbursement of UNL in excess of
its SIR amounts under the Package Policies for approximately 91 Abuse Claims, which the
Assureds had litigated, settled, or otherwise resolved. Sugayan Dec., Ex. 16; IE at 0062.
Coverage for those claims was eventually resolved and, in April and May 2010, LMI and the
Debtor executed the 2010 Settlement Agreement and Release (“2010 Agreement”). Id. Pursuant
to the 2010 Agreement, solvent LMI paid $2,638,755 in exchange for the full release of (i) the 91
sexual abuse claims and (ii) all claims where an abuse victim had demanded or received
compensation from the Debtor at any point in time up to and including October 22, 2009. Id. at
pp. 7-10 of 20; IE at 0077.
The New Jersey Child Sexual Abuse Act (“CSAA”) went into effect in 2012. The CSAA
imposes liability on a passive abuser “standing in loco parentis who knowingly permits or
acquiesces in sexual abuse by any other person . . . .” N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-l(a)(1). In 2019, New
Jersey enacted the Child Victims Act (“CVA”), which opened a window for claims barred by the
statute of limitations, not just those where the Discovery Rule applied. See N.J. Stat. Ann. §2A:142b. In 2019, the Debtor established an Independent Victim Compensation Program (“IVCP”),
administered by Ken Feinberg and Camille Biros, which resolved 71 claims for a total of
$8,102,500, for an average per claim payment of $114,000. Disclosure Statement for Fifth
Amended Plan at 43-44 (IE at 1047); Deposition of Romy Comiter “(Comiter Depo.”), Exhibit 1
at 14 (IE at 0004).
In October 2020, the Debtor filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in this Court. It also
filed a Complaint against LMI and other Certain Settling Insurers seeking declaratory relief,
thereby commencing the adversary proceeding entitled, The Diocese of Camden, New Jersey v.

14
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Insurance Company of North America, now known as Chubb Limited, et al., Case No. 20-01573JNP (“Adversary Proceeding”). Dkt. 1.
The Court set a June 30, 2021, bar date for Abuse Claimants to file proofs of claim. See
Dkt. 409; IE at 0007. 325 POC Abuse Claimants filed 345 POC Abuse Claims before the bar
date. Of those, 187 potentially allege sexual abuse during the LMI policy periods or were
otherwise tendered to LMI.13, LMI sent coverage letters, reserving all rights, in response to each
of the POC Abuse Claims, at least in part, during the periods when there was occurrence coverage
under the LMI Policies and when there was no Sexual Misconduct Exclusion (i.e., from November
27, 1972, to November 27, 1985).

See Sugayan Dec., at ¶ 20, referencing LMI000001-

LMI001791, and Ex. 17 thereto; IE at 0062, 0079. LMI also sent an omnibus coverage letter,
declining coverage for all POC Abuse Claims that alleged abuse outside of LMI’s periods of
coverage or during a period in which LMI’s coverage was subject to a Sexual Misconduct
Exclusion. See Id., and Ex. 18 thereto; IE at 0062, 0080.
C.

The Adversary Proceeding.

13

The following POC appear to be duplicates and/or corrected copies of other POC filed by
the same Claimant (original in parentheses): 182 and 269 (25); 191 (31); 89 (32); 449 (85); 103
(93); 100 (94); 102 (95); 101 (96); 99 (97); 112 (111); 132 (131); 178 (176); 392 (181); 386 (196)
420 (281); 384 (371); 398 (388); 396 (390); and 434 (432). POC that allege abuse that occurred
between November 27, 1972 and November 27, 1987, including Claim Nos. 61, 63, 82, 85 (449),
93 (103), 95 (102), 96 (101), 97 (99), 109-111 (112), 114, 117-119, 121, 122, 124, 125, 127, 128,
131 (132), 134-136, 139-145, 148-150, 152- 154, 157, 160-163, 165, 166, 168, 170, 171, 173, 176
(178), 183, 185, 187, 189, 193, 196 (386), 197, 198, 200-202, 204, 209, 212, 213, 216, 218, 220,
221, 223-235, 237, 239, 241, 243, 244-246, 252-256, 260, 263, 266, 267, 270-272, 276, 281 (420),
283, 288, 320, 343, 351, 353-355, 368, 369, 371 (384), 374-376, 379, 381-383, 385, 388 (398),
390 (396), 394, 415, 416, 418, 419, 423, 426, 427, 429-432 (434), 433, 435, 436, 438-440, 444,
446, 447, 451-453, 456, 458, 460, 462, 463, 465-470, 474, 476-479, 482, 490, 492, 493, 495-502,
505-507, 509-511, 513, 516 and 517.
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The Debtor filed a First Amended Adversary Complaint Seeking Declaratory Relief
Respecting the Rights, Duties and Liabilities of Defendants Under Insurance Policies, and
Determining Rights Under Said Policies are Property of the Bankruptcy Estate Pursuant to 11
U.S.C. §541 in the Adversary Proceeding. See Case No. 20-01573-JNP, Doc. 10 (“Amended
Adversary Complaint”). LMI filed an Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Count I of the Amended
Adversary Complaint and Jury Demand (“Answer”).14 See Adversary Proceeding, Dkt. 68; IE at
1002. In their Answer, LMI asserted the following affirmative defenses:
a. The Court lacks jurisdiction over the Adversary Proceeding;
b. The Court should abstain from hearing the Adversary Proceeding;
c. The Adversary Proceeding is a non-core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157, which the
Court may not adjudicate finally, and is outside the Court’s constitutional authority to
adjudicate;
d. The Debtor failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted;
e. The Debtor’s claims are barred to the extent that it fails to prove the existence and terms
of all policies;
f. The obligations of the insurers subscribing the policies are several only, up to the
amounts specified in each policy, and not joint. Thus, even if there is a covered UNL,
the amount LMI will indemnify will be less than the policy limits;
g. The coverage provided by LMI is excess of SIRs or underlying limits;
h. LMI have no obligation to indemnify until after the litigation of the underlying claim
is resolved and coverage for such claim has been determined;
i. There is no coverage for an entity for person that is not an “Assured” under the LMI
Policies;
j. LMI are obligated only to indemnify an Assured only for liability imposed by law.
LMI have no legal liability for voluntary or pastoral payments;

14

Count II of the First Amended Adversary Complaint was dismissed without prejudice as to LMI
pursuant to a Stipulation and Consent Order. See Adv. No. 20-01573-JNP Dkt. 41.
16
DM3\8525874.5

Case 20-21257-JNP

Doc 2478 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 19:30:40
Document
Page 25 of 80

Desc Main

k. There is no coverage for the Abuse Claims because the Debtor did not provide timely
notice to LMI after the claims were initially brought to the Debtor’s attention;
l. There is no coverage for the Abuse Claims because the Debtor failed to cooperate and
provide any claim information;
m. There is no coverage because the Debtor’s use of Porter & Curtis, LLC, to tender claims
to LMI, failed to fulfill the Package Policies’ requirement that the Debtor use a “Service
Organization” to tender claims;
n. The Debtor’s failure to provide documentation of UNL, claimants, the alleged
perpetrators and otherwise violates the General Conditions of the Package Policies and
precludes coverage;
o. The Debtor’s failure to sue for coverage within twenty-seven months of the date upon
which loss occurred precludes indemnity for such loss;
p. There is no coverage for any UNL allocable to an occurrence that pre- or post-dates the
LMI Policies;
q. There is no coverage for Abuse Claims under the Package Policy effective from
November 27, 1986, to November 27, 1987, because that policy only covers claims
made during that period;
r. There is no coverage for Abuse Claims if the Debtor was aware of the alleged
perpetrator’s propensities prior to or during the alleged abuse;
s. There is no coverage for volitional acts, including fraud, misrepresentation, intentional
conduct, etc.;
t. LMI only indemnify UNL;
u. The Debtor failed to sufficiently assert a claim for “Aggregate Excess Coverage” under
the Package Policies;
v. The Debtor’s failure to inform, or misrepresentation, of its knowledge that certain of
its priests had engaged in sexual misconduct precludes coverage under the LMI
Policies;
w. There is no coverage for false or fraudulent claims;
x. There is no coverage for prior claims;
y. The LMI Policies include an “Assault and Battery” exclusion, which may exclude
coverage for certain of the claims against the Debtor;
z. Applicable law and public policy may preclude coverage for punitive damages;
aa. There is no coverage for any uncovered portion of UNL;
17
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bb. Coverage may be barred by reason of “Other Insurance” conditions in the LMI Policies;
cc. Coverage for the Abuse Claims may be barred by the Maintenance of Underlying
Insurance Conditions in the High Layer Excess Policies;
dd. Coverage for the Abuse Claims may be barred by the Notice Conditions in the High
Layer Excess Policies;
ee. Coverage for the Abuse Claims may be barred by the Sexual Misconduct Exclusions
in the LMI Policies;
ff. The claims against LMI may be barred a lack of justiciability;
gg. Most if not all of the Abuse Claims remain unresolved, hence, the coverage claims are
unripe for adjudication;
hh. Coverage for the Abuse Claims may be barred by reason of accord and satisfaction,
payment or release;
ii. The coverage claims against LMI may be barred by the Debtor’s failure to include all
necessary and indispensable parties;
jj. The coverage claims against LMI may be barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel;
kk. The coverage claims against LMI are barred by the doctrines of waiver, estoppel and
laches;
ll. The coverage claims fail because of other terms, exclusions, conditions or limitations
in the LMI Policies; and
mm.

The coverage claims against LMI may be barred pursuant to the 2010 Agreement.

Answer, at 14-29; IE at 1002.
In the Adversary Proceeding, the Debtor produced insurance policy documents, claim files,
and perpetrator files, which included the alleged perpetrators affiliated with the Debtor, and
identification by the Debtor of which perpetrators were not affiliated with the Assureds or had an
unknown affiliation. LMI produced policy documents and the 2010 Agreement and issued

18
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coverage letters identifying the coverage defenses with respect to the POC Abuse Claims. See
Sugayan Dec. at ¶20, and Ex. 17 thereto; IE at 0079.15
D.

The Mediation.

On May 20, 2021, this Court entered its Order (I) Appointing Mediator, (II) Referring
Certain Matters to Mediation, and (III) Granting Related Relief requiring the Official Committee
of Tort Claimant Creditors (“Committee”), the Assureds, and the Debtor’s insurers, to mediate
with Judge Linares. See Dkt. 640. In January 2022, after multiple mediation sessions, including
eight full days of in-person mediation sessions in which LMI’s lead underwriter and counsel
participated, the Settling Parties agreed to the Settlement Agreement. See 9019 Motion (IE at
0011); Disclosure Statement to Fifth Amended Plan at 3-4, 79-80 and 91 (IE at 1047).
E.

The 9019 Motion.

On January 5, 2022, the Debtor filed the Original 9019 Motion. Thereafter, the Certain
Settling Insurers, the Debtor, and the Committee engaged in further mediation sessions in an
attempt to reach a global resolution that involved the Committee. While a global resolution was
not reached, during that mediation session, the Certain Settling Insurers agreed to increase the
amount of Insurance Contribution from $ $27,198,000.00 to $30 million. As a result, on February
2, 2022, the Debtor filed the 9019 Supplement. Several of the Certain Settling Insurers filed papers
in support of the 9019 Motion. See Dkts. 1220, 1223, 1226, 1227, 1228 and 1229. Subsequently,
the Court entered the Order (I) Scheduling Motion for Entry of an Order to Approve Settlement of
Controversy by and Among the Diocese and Certain Settling Insurers Pursuant to Federal Rule of

15

LMI sent to the Debtor a coverage position letter regarding the POC Abuse Claims within
their periods of coverage and these letters were copied to the Committee. Exhibit 17 to the Sugayan
Declaration is just one of those letters and is redacted here given the inclusion of confidential proof
of claim information. LMI produced their coverage letters at LMI000265-LMI001747.
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Bankruptcy 9019(a) and (II) Approving Notice Thereof [Dkt. 1219], as modified by the Amended
Order Scheduling Motion for Entry of an Order to Approve Settlement of Controversy by and
Among the Diocese and Certain Settling Insurers Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy 9019(a)
[Dkt. 1360] (together, “9019 Scheduling Order”). In accordance therewith, the Settling Parties
and the Committee engaged in extensive discovery, including, inter alia, retaining experts,
preparing expert and rebuttal reports, taking and defending multiple depositions, organizing and
preparing trial exhibits and briefs, and preparing motions in limine and other related motions. See
e.g., Dkt. 446; Dkt. 1449; Dkt. 1451; Dkt. 1453; Dkt. 1455; Dkt. 1457; Dkt. 1458; Dkt. 1460; Dkt.
1462. Pursuant to the 9019 Scheduling Order, a four-day evidentiary hearing on the 9019 Motion
and approval of the Settlement Agreement was scheduled to commence on April 19, 2022.
F.

Debtor’s Repudiation of the Settlement Agreement.

On April 11, 2022, after the Settling Parties and the Committee attended a final mediation
session with Judge Linares in an attempt to reach a consensual resolution before commencement
of the April 9019 Hearing, the Debtor informed the Settling Parties that it had reached an
agreement with the Committee and would be requesting a status conference with the Court on the
next day, April 12, 2022,

During that status conference, with just seven days until the

commencement of the April 9019 Hearing, the Debtor informed the Court of its settlement with
the Committee (“Tort Committee Settlement”) and advised the Court and parties in interest that
the Tort Committee Settlement did not include the Settlement Agreement, and the Debtor would
be withdrawing the 9019 Motion, abandoning the Fifth Amended Plan, and pursuing an amended
plan consistent with the Tort Committee Settlement.
G.

The Eighth Amended Plan and Combined Hearing.

The Tort Committee Settlement, which requires the Assureds to contribute $87.5 million
to a trust for the benefit of POC Abuse Claimants, is embodied in the Eighth Amended Plan, which
20
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has been solicited to the Debtor’s creditors and is scheduled for a multi-day confirmation hearing
commencing October 6, 2022. LMI and certain of the Settling Insures have objected to the Eighth
Amended Plan.
A hearing on the 9019 Motion and Settlement Agreement is also scheduled to commence
on October 6, 2022.16
III.

THE COURT SHOULD APPROVE THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.
A.

The Plan Proponents Cannot Show the Good Faith and Changed
Circumstances Sufficient for the Court to Deny the 9019 Motion and Confirm
the Plan

A threshold issue is whether the Debtor may repudiate the Settlement Agreement and seek
confirmation of the Eighth Amended Plan – in direct violation of the Settlement Agreement and
its duties of good faith thereunder and under the Bankruptcy Code – because of “changed
circumstances”. It cannot. To the contrary, there are no “changed circumstances” sufficient to
justify the Debtor’s repudiation of the Settlement Agreement, and the Debtor has acted in bad faith.
The Court should approve the Settlement Agreement and deny confirmation of the Eighth
Amended Plan.
In Martin, 91 F.3d at 394, the Third Circuit explained how a debtor may, despite its duty
of good faith, abandon a previous post-bankruptcy settlement, i.e., when, after the debtor performs
its duties not to undermine the rights of the other settling parties, the Bankruptcy Court denies
approval of the prior settlement, due to “changed circumstances” sufficient to approve the new
settlement. The Court of Appeals stated: “the trustee was required to deal with the Myers with

16

The 9019 Motion is only scheduled for a hearing because LMI and certain of the other
Certain Settling Insurers filed a motion to compel a hearing, to which the Debtor and Committee
objected. See London Market Insurers’ Motion for an Order Scheduling a Hearing on the
Insurance Settlement, [Dkt. 1615].
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"honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned … and [to] refrain from doing anything
that would destroy or injure the other party's right to receive the fruits of the contract." Id., 91
F.3d at 393. In Martin, following the agreement between the Myers and the Trustee, the Martins
continued to litigate against the Myers in state court, and prevailed, hence their probability of
success on the merits was 100 percent, which mooted the Bankruptcy Court’s consideration of the
first Martin factor. The Trustee had no control or influence over the litigation between Myers and
the Martins. Consequently, because of the Trustee’s good faith actions (contrary to the Debtor’s
actions here), and because the litigation affected how the Bankruptcy Court could assess the first
Martin factor, the Third Circuit did not approve the settlement with the Myers. The Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel for the First Circuit adopted the same reasoning in PRLP 2011 Holdings, LLC v.
Manuel Mediavilla, Inc. (In re Manuel Mediavilla, Inc.), 568 B.R. 551, 560–62 (1st Cir. B.A.P.
2017),
In Manuel Mediavilla, subsequent to an agreement between the debtor and its secured
creditor, the debtor obtained a favorable ruling on the secured creditor’s plan objections, then
sought to repudiate the settlement. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held “The fortuity of the
December 30, 2015 Decision did not absolve the Debtors of their obligations under the Settlement
Agreement”. Id. at 573. In contrast to Martin, as in this case, the Debtors did not comply with
their fiduciary duties in good faith. “As fiduciaries, the Debtors should have complied with the
Settlement Agreement, at least until a time when, after notice and opportunity for hearing, the
court declined to approve the agreement. That did not happen here Id. at 574”. Notably, the
favorable ruling would not have negated any of the Martin factors. Hence, the Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel ruled in favor of the secured creditor.
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To obtain approval of a new settlement that is inconsistent with a prior settlement that has
not yet been approved the Court, the Debtor must show two things: First, the Debtor must show
that there are changed circumstances sufficient to affect the Court’s analysis of the Martin factors.
Second, the Debtor must act in good faith in its treatment of the previous settlement and do nothing
to undercut the rights of the other parties to the previous settlement. Neither has occurred here
and the Debtor may not repudiate the Settlement Agreement.
1.

Changed Circumstances.

The Debtor asserts that the settlement with “the Committee embodied in the Plan presents
changed circumstances” Opposition to Century’s and Interstate’s Motion to Enforce August 30,
2022, Audio Ruling (Dkt. No. 2347) and Preclude Evidence, Dkt. 2431, at Ex. A (“Objection to
Enforcement”). In other words, the Plan is the changed circumstances. That cannot be. The
Debtor cannot be the author of changed circumstances affecting the Debtor.
The Debtor and the Committee negotiated the terms of their settlement and what eventually
became the Eighth Amended Plan from early January 2022 until April 11. 2002. They exchanged
term sheets and numerous emails, and met repeatedly. The Debtor was one of the actors in that
process. The circumstances never changed; the Debtor had a change of mind, but no circumstances
ever changed. The Debtor was in complete control of the whole process and was not an innocent
victim of circumstances arising from the activities of other persons.
The other arguments put forth by the Debtor do not even purportedly constitute “changed
circumstances.” For example, on May 18, 2022, in its Objection of the Official Committee of Tort
Claimant Creditors to London Marker Insurers’ Motion for an Order Scheduling a Hearing on
the Insurance Settlement, Dkt. 1672, ¶ 10, the Debtor made the following argument:
First, the Committee vehemently opposed the proposed settlement and introduced
considerable evidence establishing that approval of the 9019 Motion was a far cry
from certain and, at least from the Committee’s perspective, unlikely to be achieved.
23
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Second, the Committee made clear that approval of the 9019 Motion and
confirmation of any plan of reorganization embodying that settlement would be
vigorously contested and even if the Debtor managed to receive approval of them,
those decisions would be appealed. Third, and most significantly, the Debtor and
the Committee reached a settlement which resolved many of the disputes between
them, including:
(i)
The Committee’s objection to the 9019 Motion and the plan of
reorganization embodying that settlement;
(ii)

The fair and equitable treatment of Survivor claims;

(iii)

The terms of a jointly proposed Plan; and

(iv)
The Committee’s appeal of the denial of its Motion of the Official
Committee of Tort Claimant Creditors for Entry of an Order Granting it
Standing and Authorizing it to Prosecute and Settle Certain Claims on
Behalf of the Debtor’s Estate. [Dkt. No. 871].
Objection of the Official Committee of Tort Claimant Creditors to London Marker Insurers’
Motion for an Order Scheduling a Hearing on the Insurance Settlement, Dkt. 1672, ¶ 10.
None of these points constitutes changed circumstances. The first two points are not
circumstances at all, but simply summary rehashes of the Committee’s arguments in its brief. Such
rehashes are not evidence, let alone evidence of “changed circumstances”.
In particular, the first point says that the Committee “introduced considerable evidence
establishing that approval of the 9019 Motion was a far cry from certain and, at least from the
Committee’s perspective, unlikely to be achieved”. Neither the Debtor nor the Committee has
produced any evidence whatsoever to show that this Court would not approve the Settlement
Agreement; indeed, no such evidence could exist. The first point is preposterous.
The third point is another repetition that the “Plan is the changed circumstances”, refuted
above.
2.

The Debtor’s Intentional Harm to the Certain Settling Insurers’
Rights under the Settlement Agreement.
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The Debtor did not perform its fiduciary duties to the Certain Settling Insurers, and instead
sought to destroy and injure the Certain Settling Insurers’ rights to receive the fruits of the
Settlement Agreement.
In Martin, the Court of Appeals emphasized that the trustee “took no affirmative steps to
withdraw the motion to approve, but simply supplied additional information to the court, disclosing
the state court verdict”. Id. at 395. The Trustee was not involved in that litigation. The court
emphasized that “[t]his trustee did not flout or breach any term of the stipulation.” Id. at 393. If
the trustee’s only duty were to maximize assets for the estate, these caveats would be unnecessary.
Instead, under Martin, merely informing the court of changed circumstances does not cure a breach
of the underlying agreement. Manuel Mediavilla, cautioned “if a party could unilaterally withdraw
from a settlement agreement, he or she could strategically enter a settlement agreement and
effectively ‘stay’ the proceedings against him and repudiate on the eve of court approval without
consequence”. Id. at 573. It explained “[c]ondoning such strategy wastes the time and resources
of the bankruptcy court and the time and resources of the parties who may have spent hours and
substantial sums of money in negotiations, contract drafting, and contract execution. It also places
the estate in a precarious position when negotiating settlements”. Id. It held that “[a]s fiduciaries,
the Debtors should have complied with the Settlement Agreement, at least until a time when,
after notice and opportunity for hearing, the court declined to approve the agreement. That did
not happen here.” Id. (emphasis added).
Here, also, it did not happen. The following are merely a few of the examples of the
Debtor’s attempts to injure and destroy the Certain Settling Insurers’ rights to the fruits of the
Settlement Agreement:


Paragraph 6d. of the Settlement Agreement: “DOC will seek entry of the
Confirmation Order, as set forth in Section 1.jj., together with the Confirmation
25
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Findings and Conclusions, as set forth in Section 1.ii., including any required
findings and conclusions under the Bankruptcy Code”. The Debtor overtly
breached its obligations under the Settlement Agreement.


See Email to Chambers of Judge Poslusny from Robert S. Roglieri stating, “The
Diocese and the Committee have reached a tentative settlement today at mediation.
As a result, the Diocese requests that the Court hold a status conference tomorrow
(April 11, 2022) at 2 pm to discuss the scheduling of various matters, if the Court
is available”. See Exhibit A.



At the April 11, 2022, hearing, the Debtor’s counsel stated that the Debtor would
be withdrawing the 9019 Motion.



See Transcript of Hearing Before the Honorable Jerrold N. Poslusny, Jr. United
States Bankruptcy Judge, April 27, 2022 (“Mr. Trenk: […] on April 12th, we asked
for a conference. And on April 13th, we had a conference call with the Court as
part of the status, and we reported that there was a settlement in focus with the Tort
Claim Committee, and that as a result of that settlement, which the Debtor agrees
is in the best interest of the Estate, that we intended to file an amended Plan of
Reorganization by last Friday, April 22nd”.).



The Sixth Amended Plan of Reorganization [Dkt. 1527] (omitting the Settlement
Agreement).



The Seventh Amended Plan of Reorganization [Dkt. 1568] (The Debtor’s second
attempt to confirm a plan that does not include the Settlement Agreement).



Debtor’s Objection to Application for an Order Shortening Time for the Motion for
an Order Scheduling a Hearing on the Insurance Settlement filed by LMI, [Dkt.
1618] (“Tellingly, the London Market Insurers neither point to any prejudice they
might suffer if the Scheduling Motion is heard on the notice required under this
Court’s Local Rules nor do they allege any other reason to consider the relief they
seek on an emergent basis, except for the conclusory statement that a ruling on the
Scheduling Motion must be made before Plan confirmation proceedings
commence. As established above, however, this assertion of “cause” stems from
the London Market Insurers’ failure to timely take action”.).



Objection of the Diocese of Camden, New Jersey to London Market Insurers’
Motion for an Order Scheduling a Hearing on the Insurance Settlement, [Dkt. 1670]
(“Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the Court may proceed with a hearing on
the Proposed Insurance Settlement, but that the Diocese does not need to support
the Proposed Insurance Settlement. Instead, and more importantly, the Diocese
may demonstrate to the Court why confirmation of the Plan is in the best interests
of the estate through changed circumstances. Those ‘changed circumstances’ are
the Plan”.).
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The Eighth Amended Plan of Reorganization [Dkt. 1725] (The Debtor’s current
plan that does not include the Settlement Agreement).



The Debtor’s Discovery Dispute Letter, dated July 8, 2022 [Dkt. 1965] (opposing
the insurers’ attempts to conduct discovery).



The Plan Proponents’ and Other Catholic Entities’ Brief (I) in Support of Their
Motions for a Protective Order; and (II) in Opposition to the Memorandum of
Insurers in Support of their Standing to Object to the Plan and Take Plan Discovery
in Connection Therewith and in Further Support of the Insurers’ Letter Briefs
Concerning Discovery [Dkt. 2014] (“[…] the Insurers lack standing to object to
confirmation of the Plan. The Court’s determination of whether the Plan is
insurance neutral now will (i) avoid the needless expenditure of substantial time,
effort, and estate funds by the Plan Proponents to respond to discovery and legal
objections which the Insurers have no standing to bring, and (ii) prevent the Insurers
from using the filing of the Plan as a subterfuge to conduct discovery for purposes
of any future litigation”.).



The Debtor’s Letter Regarding the July 20, 2022 Status Conference, dated July 19,
2022, [Dkt. 2049] (“Despite this mandate that all Participating Parties are entitled
to discovery and participation in the Plan Confirmation proceedings, the Insurers,
and, more specifically, Century, demonstrate clear gamesmanship by repeatedly
failing to include all Participating Parties and, at times, purposefully excluding
certain counsel from pertinent emails. Such actions should not be countenanced by
this Court”).



Diocese’s Letter Brief in Support of Motion to Quash Century Indemnity
Company’s Deposition Notice on Patrick McGrory [Dkt. 2109] (preventing the
insurers from taking discovery of Patrick McGrory, vice chair of the Diocese’s
Finance Council).



Notice of Objection to Depositions of Designated Fiduciaries Matthew Dundon and
Paul A. Finn [Dkt. 2112] (preventing the insurers from taking discovery of Matthew
Dundon, the proposed Trust Administrator and Paul Finn, the proposed Abuse
Claims Reviewer).



Diocese’s Opposition to Interstate Fire & Casualty Company’s Motion to Adjourn
Certain Dates and Deadlines in Connection with Confirmation of the Eighth
Amended Plan of Reorganization, [Dkt. 2186] (“The Court is likely unphased by
the Insurers’ latest antics to delay this case in order to avoid their duties under their
respective insurance policies to insure the Diocese related to the Survivor Claims.
In doing so, the Insurers seek to mischaracterize these proceedings to serve their
own interests of delay. The Court should not countenance such tactics”.).



Diocese’s Letter to Judge Poslusny Requesting Revision to Schedule, [Dkt. 2238]
(“Regardless, as the Court can imagine it is unlikely that we will reach a full
27
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agreement concerning any discovery especially since the Insurers continue to be on
a wild goose chase to find a term sheet or plan support agreement which does not
exist”.).


Diocese’s Letter Regarding Outstanding Discovery Disputes in Accordance with
Court Ruling, [Dkt. 2264] (“The Diocese respectfully requests that Court that the
Court limit the discovery sought by the Insurers, which is irrelevant to the issues
for which the Insurers have standing and is wholly inappropriate in these
proceedings”.).



Letter Brief in Support of Diocese’s Emergency Motion to Schedule Hearing on
9019 Motion to Begin on September 19, 2022, [Dkt. 2270] (“The vote is clear – the
Diocese’s creditors want the Plan to move forward to confirmation. The only
impediment is the delays of the Insurers, which only benefits the Insurers by
avoiding their responsibilities under the Diocese’s policies”.).



Diocese’s Response to Insurer Discovery Letters, dated August 24, 2022, [Dkt.
2301] (“For the reasons set forth herein, the Diocese respectfully requests that the
Diocese deny the discovery issues set forth in the Interstate/Century/AIG Letter and
LMI Letter. There is no basis for the Insurers to be seeking additional discovery in
this matter”.).



Letter Brief in Opposition to Century Indemnity Company’s Motion to Compel the
Debtor to Produce Ms. Cutter’s Notes and Audio Tapes, [Dkt. 2357] (preventing
the insurers’ from accessing relevant records from the Debtor’s meetings).



Motion in Limine to Exclude Any Evidence Potentially Proffered by the Insurers
Regarding (i) Administrative Claims; (ii) Feasibility of the Plan; (iii) Issues for
Which the Insurers Have No Standing; (iv) Internal Valuation of Claims by the
Insurers; and (v) the Insurers Coverage Defenses, [Dkt. 2403] (seeking to prevent
the insurers from presenting evidence at plan confirmation).

Based on the foregoing, the Debtor has intentionally harmed the Certain Settling Insurers’
and interfered with their rights under the Settlement Agreement.
B.

The Settlement Merits Approval under Bankruptcy Rule 9019.

Settlements and compromises are not only permitted in bankruptcy, they are favored and
encouraged because they minimize costs of litigation and further the parties’ interest in expediting
administration of the bankruptcy estate. Martin, 91 F.3d at 393 (“To minimize litigation and
expedite the administration of a bankruptcy estate, “[c]ompromises are favored in bankruptcy”)
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(internal quotations omitted); In re Nutraquest, Inc., 434 F.3d 639, 644 (3d Cir. 2006)
(“Settlements are favored, but the unique nature of the bankruptcy process means that judges must
carefully examine settlements before approving them”). Settling allows the parties to avoid
uncertainty and the costs of litigation. Baker Depo., 16:7-9, 14-18 (IE at 0005); Deposition of
Marc Scarcella (“Scarcella Depo.”), 43:13-24 (IE at 0002).
Bankruptcy Rule 9019 provides, in pertinent part: “On motion by the trustee and after
notice and a hearing, the court may approve a compromise or settlement”. Fed. R. Bankr. P.
9019(a). When deciding whether to approve a proposed settlement under Rule 9019, a court must
determine whether the proposal is “fair and equitable”. Nutraquest, 434 F.3d at 644. Although it
is the movant’s burden to establish that the proposed compromise is fair and equitable and in the
best interests of the estate, that “burden is not high”. In re Roqumore, 393 B.R. 474, 480 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 2008) (emphasis added).
To determine whether a settlement is fair and equitable, the Court need only canvas
the issues to determine whether the settlement falls above the lowest point in the
range of reasonableness. Whether a settlement is above the lowest point in the
range of reasonableness, in turn, is determined by considering the Martin factors.
In re Capmark Fin. Grp. Inc., 438 B.R. 471, 475-76 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010); see also In re TCI 2
Holdings, LLC, 428 B.R. 117, 137 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010).
Courts within the Third Circuit evaluate debtor settlements utilizing the Martin factors,
which are: “(1) the probability of success in litigation; (2) the likely difficulties in collection; (3)
the complexity of the litigation involved, and the expense, inconvenience and delay necessarily
attending it; and (4) the paramount interest of the creditors”. Martin, 91 F.3d at 393 (citing In re
Neshaminy Office Bldg. Assocs., 62 B.R. 798, 803 (E.D. Pa. 1986)); see also Nutraquest, Inc., 434
F.3d at 644.
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The Committee has provided no evidence, positive or negative, with respect to the Martin
factors, except (a) as discussed by Mr. Baker in his deposition concerning Martin factors 1 and 3,
and (b) Ms. McNally’s discounting of claim values due to the Debtor’s liability defenses,
inadequate though it was, regarding Martin factor 1.
1.

Factor 1--The Probability of Success in Litigation.

The evidence shows that Martin Factor 1, the probability of success in the litigation,
supports approval of the Settlement Agreement.
“[T]he purpose is not to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, but to canvass the
issues to assess the risks associated with prosecuting the various claims.” In re Cellular Info. Sys.,
Inc., 171 B.R. 926, 950 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994); see also In re Trib. Co., 464 B.R. 126, 158 (Bankr.
D. Del.).
First, if the Debtor itself is not liable for a POC Abuse Claim, then, by definition, neither
can its insurers be liable. Second, if the Debtor is held liable, there are numerous coverage defenses
that directly impact the Debtor’s ability to succeed in the Adversary Proceeding. Both Marc
Scarcella of Roux and Romy Comiter of FTI, expert witnesses for the Debtor and LMI / Interstate,
took coverage defenses into account in forming their opinions. Neither Ms. McNally nor Mr.
Baker, the Committee’s proposed expert witnesses, did so. The reason they did not is transparent:
the coverage defenses would massively reduce any liability of LMI.
The determination of the coverage defenses can only be done by litigation of the Adversary
Proceeding. That case is stayed, despite LMI moving for stay relief to resolve the coverage issues
before confirmation. Thus, while those defenses cannot be quantified now, they cannot be ignored.
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Defenses to the Debtor’s Liability.

For the Debtor to obtain coverage for a POC Abuse Claim, the POC Abuse Claimants must
first prove that the Debtor is legally liable to them. Comiter Depo., (IE at 0004) 34:18-19; 95:896:12; 159:16-23; Exhibit 1 at 16-17.
The Package Policies agree to indemnify the Debtor for sums it is “obligated to pay by
reason of the liability imposed upon the Assured by law”. See, e.g., Baker Depo. (IE at 0005),
Exhibit 3; Comiter Depo., 34:18-19 (IE at 0004). Thus, to the extent a POC Abuse Claimant’s
allegations and injuries are not credible or the POC Abuse Claim is subject to defenses, LMI would
have no indemnity obligation, as the Assured would have no liability, in the first place. Comiter
Depo. (IE at 0004), 95:8-96:12.
Because sexual misconduct towards minors is outside the scope of a priest’s duties and not
intended to serve the interests of the Church, vicarious liability is not a viable claim against the
Assureds. See Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark. 95 N.J. 530, 535 (1984) (only
rarely do intentional torts fall within the scope of employment); Cosgrove v. Lawrence, 214 N.J.
Super. 670, 679-80 (Law Div. 1986), aff’d per curiam, 215 N.J. Super. 561, 563 (App. Div. 1987)
(no vicarious liability against a therapist’s employer since having sex with a patient is not within
the scope of employment).
Courts have recognized claims under the CSAA for negligent retention and supervision.
See e.g. Bryson v. The Diocese of Camden, 909 F. Supp. 2d 364 (D.N.J. 2012). The CSAA predated the Child Victims Act but remains effective. The CSAA imposes liability on a passive
abuser “standing in loco parentis who knowingly permits or acquiesces in sexual abuse by any
other person . . . .” N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-l(a)(1). New Jersey recognizes the “tort of negligent hiring”,
which requires an employer either have known, or should have known, that an employee was
violent or aggressive, or that the employee might engage in injurious conduct toward third persons.
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The tort has two fundamental

requirements. First, the employer must have known “or had reason to know of the particular
unfitness, incompetence or dangerous attributes of the employee and could reasonably have
foreseen that such qualities created a risk of harm to other persons”. DiCosala v. Kay, 91 N.J. 159,
172-73 (1982). Second, through the negligence of the employer in hiring the employee, the latter's
unfitness or dangerous characteristics proximately caused the injury. Id. at 174; see also Briiall v.
Harrah’s Atlantic City, 2012 WL 5866223 *2 (D.N.J. 2012) (employee's lack of criminal history
and uneventful work history prior to the incident would not support a claim of negligent hiring).17
Failure to prove the essential elements will negate liability under the CSAA.
Whether under the “Discovery Rule”, the CSAA, or the CVA, the Debtor must be legally
liable to a particular claimant before LMI are required to indemnify any UNL. While the POC
Abuse Claims allege abuse, most fail to allege a reason that the Debtor is liable for such alleged
abuse. In fact, many of the alleged perpetrators have no connection to the Debtor or had no prior
assertions of abuse against them.
There are 324 non-duplicative POC Abuse Claims. See Wilen Depo. at 31:25-32:3. Fortythree of those are subject to complete defenses on the part of the Assureds. Wilen Depo (IE at
0001), Exhibit 6 pp. 20-28; Scarcella Depo. (IE at 0002), Exhibit 2, n. 818; see id., 122:3-123:10.
Scarcella assigned only 281 claims any value. Id., Exhibit 2, n. 8. The no-value claims include

17

The 2019 amendments to the Charitable Immunity Act (“CIA”), only permit retroactive
suits against non-profit organizations for claims of gross negligence and willful and wanton
conduct. N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7. Claims of simple negligence against non-profit entities are still
barred. See id.; see also Hardwicke v. American Boychoir School, 188 N.J. 69 (2006).
18

The following POC Abuse Claims alleged abuse by a perpetrator referenced in Section
III.B.b.vi, infra, or failed to name an alleged perpetrator(s): POC Claim Nos. 85 (449), 139, 143,
171, 173, 209, 212, 213, 220, 229, 244, 255, 256, 267, 272, 276, 281/420, 416, 418, 419, 423, 433,
436, 447, 453, 460, 469, 476, 479, 482, 506, 513.
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claims (i) of abuse made against Boy Scouts of America leaders with no connection to the Debtor
or a Parish; (ii) of abuse made against priests that were not part of the Debtor; (iii) previously
settled; and (iv) with no details. Id.
Sixty-one of the remaining POC Abuse Claims are low value claims. Scarcella Depo.,
Exhibit 2, n. 8. The low-value claims include, but are not limited to, claims that: (i) do not allege
any connection to the Debtor or the Parishes; (ii) are against priests who have no other claims
made against them and no evidence of misconduct has ever been reported against the priest; (iii)
are insufficiently detailed to determine who the alleged abuser is; or (iv) the victim of abuse was
an adult at the time of the alleged abuse. Wilen Depo. (IE at 0001), at 56:21-59:7; Scarcella
Depo. (IE at 0002), Exhibit 3; Comiter Depo. (IE at 0004), 161:4-13; Exhibit 1 at 16-17;
Appendix G.
The Debtor produced documents and responded to follow-up inquiries from LMI about
those documents that identified the following alleged perpetrators as non-Diocesan clerics or
employees: Fr. Douglas Carroll; Fr. Leo Corsey; Col. Clyde Davis; Frank Garrison; Harold
Gauthe; Br. Walter Hicks; Fr. Robert Hermley; John Hollander; Peter Linder; Jim MacEachen;
Rev Dominic Marchese; Jo Ann McDermitt; Glen Noone; Mr. Ordelli; Norman Lee Tomasello;
John Winslow; John (Surname Unknown); Bill (Surname Unknown); and John (Surname
Unknown). See Sugayan Dec. (IE at 0062), at ¶21 and Exhibits 19(a) to 19(2) thereto (IE at 0081).
The Debtor stated that it did not possess responsive documents concerning some perpetrators,
including, among others, the following: Vincent Brennan; Sr. Catherine; Robert Clemens; Richard
Corcoran; Sr. Marita Driscoll; Ernest Frank; Gary Grant Daley; Patrick Murphy; Ronald Yanky;
and Fr. John. See id. Absent specific allegations in a POC Abuse Claim of facts showing some
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duty owed by the Debtor to a POC Abuse Claimant, the Diocese has no liability for non-Diocesan
clerics or employees.
Further, if the POC Abuse Claims do not allege facts showing that the Debtor knew or had
reason to know of a particular unfitness, incompetence, or dangerous attributes of an abuser, then
the claim cannot be sustained under New Jersey law. Many of the POC Abuse Claims fail to
allege facts showing such liability. See id., and fn. 11, supra. The Debtor has no liability for such
claims.
The evidence supporting the inability of POC Abuse Claimants to prove the Debtor’s
liability includes: (1) the documents in the chart below; (2) the LMI Policies; (3) the Wilen Depo;
(4) the Comiter expert report; and (5) the Scarcella expert report.
Dkt. 1293-18 – List of Alleged Perpetrators and Survivors (Exhibit 19(a))

DOCINS_062264062280

Dkt. 1293-19 – List of Alleged Perpetrators and Dates when Diocese First
Had Knowledge of Misconduct (Exhibit 19(b))

DOCINS_029553029562

Dkt. 1293-20 – Amended List of Alleged Perpetrators and Dates when
Diocese First Had Knowledge of Misconduct (redacted) (Exhibit 19(c))

DOCINS_062253062263

Dkt. 1293-21 – Email from R. Roglieri to S. Minorovich, et al. re:
Outstanding Documents dated 09/22/2021 (redacted) (Exhibit 19(d))

LMI001792001795

Dkt. 1293-22 – Email from R. Roglieri to M. Norton, et al. re: Outstanding
Documents dated 09/27/2021 (redacted) (Exhibit 19(e))
b.

LMI001796001801

Coverage Defenses.

Even if the Debtor is liable for a POC Abuse Claim, that liability does not translate
automatically into liability for an insurer.
As noted above, LMI pleaded thirty-nine affirmative defenses in the Adversary Proceeding.
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Only 191 POC Abuse Claims potentially alleged abuse during LMI’s periods of coverage
or were tendered directly to LMI. Comiter Depo. (IE at 0004), Exhibit 1 at 15. Of these, only 151
POC Abuse Claims potentially impair the LMI coverage. Id. at 16. However, the vast majority
of such claims are subject to at least one coverage defense. Id at 17; 34:14-35:1. LMI have
multiple defenses to approximately 40 of the POC Abuse Claims. Id.
The LMI Policies are excess indemnity policies and LMI have no obligation to reimburse
defense expenses or loss payments until after the underlying claim is resolved and coverage for
that claim has been determined, and the Assured has paid the claim. See Comiter Depo. (IE at
0004), Exhibit 1 at 20; Baker Depo. (IE at 0005), Exhibit 3 at 23; (IE at 0079). First, a claim must
be of sufficient value to impair the LMI Policies. Comiter Depo. (IE at 0004), Exhibit 1 at 19. An
Assured must defend each claim to resolution. See, e.g., Baker Depo. (IE at 0005), Exhibit 3, at
25; Answer, at 22-23 (IE at 1002); Comiter Depo. (IE at 0004), Exhibit 1 at 19. The Debtor has
historically defended and settled sexual abuse claims. It presented evidence to this Court about
how it valued the POC Abuse Claims. See Wilen Dec., Dkt. 1087-3 (IE at 0014). Absent an
Assured’s defense of claims, and performance of its other duties under the SIR, LMI have no duty
to indemnify a POC Abuse Claim. Id. If the 185 POC Abuse Claimants on average alleged abuse
in two periods, there would have to be in excess of $18,500,000 to $27,750,000 in covered UNL
before LMI’s Specific Excess Coverage could potentially be implicated; see also Scarcella Depo.,
Exhibit 1 at 7; (because of the SIRs, the Debtor and Related Entities would recover less than the
full amount of each claim).
Notably, with respect to the following defenses, i– viii, neither the Committee nor the POC
Abuse Claimants provided any contrary evidence. Comiter Depo. (IE at 0004), 34:3-7; Exhibit 1
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at 9. Ms. McNally and Mr. Baker ignored these defenses even though they are directly relevant to
the probability of success in litigation. Id.
i.

Known Claims Release.

Five of the POC Abuse Claims have already been released.
Pursuant to the 2010 Agreement, the 91 listed claimants and all other sex abuse claims
where the claimant demanded or received compensation from the Debtor as of October 22, 2009,
were released, and there is no remaining coverage for them under the LMI Policies. Ex. 16 to
Sugayan Dec., at 6-7, 19 (IE at 0078) (“Subject Claims”); see also Ex. 17 to Sugayan Dec. (IE at
0079), at LMI000479-LMI000480; Answer, at 29 (IE at 1002).
There are five POC Abuse Claimants listed as Subject Claims because (a) they were
specifically identified or (b) they demanded or received compensation from the Debtor on or before
October 22, 2009. Ex. 15, 2010 Agreement (redacted) to Sugayan Dec., at 6-7, 19 (IE at 0077).
These POC are 166, 220, 256, 351 and 440; LMI have been released from providing any coverage
for these claims.
ii.

LMI Are Only Severally Liable and Provide Indemnity
Coverage Excess of SIRs

Under the Package Policies, LMI are only severally liable, not jointly, nor jointly and
severally liable, and provide indemnity coverage excess of SIRs. “[E]ach underwriter of the excess
insurance policies sold through Lloyd's was independently liable for its own share of that policy,
and thus that defendant underwriters should not bear the loss of insolvent underwriters.” See, e.g.,
Chem. Leaman Tank Lines v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.3d 210, 219 (3d Cir. 1999). It is
undisputed that certain of the subscribing insurers to those policies are insolvent. Baker Depo. (IE
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at 0005), 97:22-98:5; Scarcella Depo. (IE at 0002), 129:11-17. The solvent LMI have no liability
to pay the shares of such insolvent insurers. Comiter Depo. (IE at 0004), Exhibit 1 at 19-20.19
Thus, to the extent LMI may be found to have an indemnity obligation, each LMI is only
liable for its respective subscribed shares. See, e.g., Baker Depo. (IE at 0005), Exhibit 3; see also
Ex. 17 to Sugayan Dec. at LMI000477 (IE at 0079); Scarcella Depo., 129:11-17 (IE at 0002) (some
LMI are insolvent); Comiter Depo. (IE at 0004), Exhibit 1 at 19-20.
iii.

Trigger of Coverage and Number of Occurrences

The Package Policies cover only “Occurrences”. The Package Policies effective from 1972
to 1986 provide coverage “on account of personal injuries . . . arising out of any occurrence
happening during the period of Insurance”. See, e.g., Baker Depo., Exhibit 3, at 23 of 37
(“Agreement C – General Liability”); see also Ex. 17 to Sugayan Dec., at LMI000477 (IE at 0079).
The term “Occurrence” is defined in part as “an accident or a happening or event or a continuous
or repeated exposure to conditions which unexpectedly and unintentionally results in personal
injury, or damage to property during the policy period. . . ”. See, e.g., Baker Depo., Exhibit 3, at
25 of 37; see also Ex. 17 to Sugayan Dec. at LMI000477 (IE at 0079); Answer, at 23 (IE at 1002).
The occurrence giving rise to a POC Abuse Claim must have occurred during the policy
period. Comiter Depo. (IE at 0004), Exhibit 1 at 16. LMI are not liable for any covered UNL
allocable to periods outside of November 27, 1972, to November 27, 1985, when LMI provided
occurrence liability coverage, and when there is no Sexual Misconduct Exclusion. See, e.g.,

19

By way of illustration, if there were a $150,000 payment that constituted covered UNL
allocable to a Package Policy, then LMI would only be obligated to pay their subscribed share of
the Specific Excess Coverage limit that exceeded the SIR. If the solvent share was 80% of a
$125,000 Specific Excess Coverage limit excess of a $75,000 SIR, then solvent LMI would have
an indemnity obligation of $60,000; the other $90,000 part of the $150,000 payment would be the
$75,000 SIR and the remainder would be the responsibility of a co-insurer or insolvent subscriber,
which under applicable New Jersey law is the responsibility of the insured.
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Comiter Depo. (IE at 0004), 34:23-24; Ex. 17 to Sugayan Dec., at LMI000478 (IE at 0079);
Answer, at 23 (IE at 1002).
There is an occurrence for each Abuse Claimant for each period when abuse took place,
including periods that pre- and post-date the LMI Policies, and any covered UNL must be allocated
in equal shares to each period. Id. In addition, the Debtor is required to exhaust an SIR for each
occurrence in each triggered policy period. See Society of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Lafayette
and Lake Charles, Inc. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 26 F.3d 1359, 1354-65 (5th Cir. 1994);
Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 21 N.Y.
3d 139 (2013); Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Lumbermens Mutual Cas. Co., et al, 826 A.2d 107
(Conn. 2002).
iv.

Sexual Misconduct Exclusion

LMI have no liability for 16 POC Abuse Claims that are outside the periods when LMI
provided occurrence coverage and/or when the LMI coverage was subject to a Sexual Misconduct
Exclusion.
The evidence shows that the LMI Policies incepting on and after November 27, 1985,
contained a Sexual Misconduct Exclusion. See, e.g., Ex. 6 to Sugayan Dec., at p. 6 of 42
(“Endorsement No. 8, Sexual Misconduct Exclusion”) (IE at 0068); Ex. 17 to Sugayan Dec., at
LMI000478 (IE at 0079); see also P.D. v. Germantown Ins. Co., 2014 WL 10102329, at *10 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. July 20, 2015) (coverage barred by sexual molestation exclusion where
negligent supervision claim arose from sexual molestation); Montville Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. Zurich
Am. Ins. Co., 2018 WL 485879, at *3–4 (D.N.J. Jan. 19, 2018) (“abusive acts” exclusion precluded
coverage for claim against a school board arising from sexual abuse by a teacher).
There were 16 POC Abuse Claims where the alleged abuse by all perpetrators is outside
the periods when LMI provided occurrence coverage and/or when the LMI coverage was subject
38
DM3\8525874.5

Case 20-21257-JNP

Doc 2478 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 19:30:40
Document
Page 47 of 80

Desc Main

to a Sexual Misconduct Exclusion. See POC Claim Nos. 96 (101), 111 (112), 118, 124, 131 (132),
134, 142, 189, 239, 271, 343, 375, 376, 388/389, 451 and 517; Comiter Depo. (IE at 0004), Exhibit
1 at 16. LMI have no liability for those 16 POC Abuse Claims. There are 24 POC Abuse Claims
where the alleged abuse by an alleged perpetrator is partially outside the periods when LMI
provided occurrence coverage and/or when the LMI coverage was subject to a Sexual Misconduct
Exclusion. See POC Claim Nos. 82, 125, 141, 163, 176 (178), 198, 200, 209, 221, 226, 229, 235,
276, 354, 371 (384), 382, 388 (398), 418, 467, 477, 497, 499, 511 and 541. LMI have no liability
for those parts of 24 POC Abuse Claims.
v.

Assureds

The Package Policies provide coverage to the Debtor and its “Parishes, Schools,
Cemeteries, and Other Agencies under specific Names” (the “Assureds” as defined above). See,
e.g., Baker Depo., Exhibit 3, at. 17-18 of 37; Ex. 17 to Sugayan Dec. at LMI000479 (IE at 0079).
They also provide coverage to “any official, trustee, or employee of the Named Assured while
acting within the scope of his duties as such” (also “Assureds”). Id. The LMI Policies do not
insure other Dioceses, Religious Orders, Boy Scout entities, or other parties who are alleged to be
potentially liable but are not Assureds. The alleged perpetrators are not Assureds. See e.g., Atl.
Emps. Ins. Co. v. Tots & Toddlers Pre-Sch. Day Care Ctr., Inc., 239 N.J. Super. 276, 283-84 (App.
Div. 1990).
Claims against non-Assureds are POC Abuse Claim numbers 85/449, 139, 143, 171, 173,
209, 212, 213, 220, 229, 244, 255, 256, 267, 272, 276, 281/420, 416, 418, 419, 423, 433, 436, 447,
453, 460, 469, 476, 479, 482, 506, 513. LMI have no liability for these POC Abuse Claims.
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There is No Coverage if a Diocesan Entity was Aware of
an Alleged Perpetrator’s Propensities Prior to or During
the Alleged Abuse.

LMI have no liability for 36 POC Abuse Claims because the evidence shows the Debtor to
have been aware of the perpetrator’s misconduct. See The Rebuttal Expert Report of Romy
Comiter of FTI Consulting (“Comiter Report”) at Appendix G.
The LMI Policies do not cover abuse that is expected or intended by an Assured. Comiter
Depo. (IE at 0004), Exhibit 1 at 14. There is no coverage if a POC Abuse Claimant alleges, or a
determination is made, that the Assured was aware of the alleged perpetrator’s deviant propensities
or history of molesting children prior to or during the alleged abuse. See, e.g., Penn Nat’l Ins. Co.
v. Grp. C Commc’ns, Inc., 2018 WL 3625424, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 31, 2018)
(citing Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 128 N.J. 165, 184 (1992)); Comiter Depo. (IE at 0004),
34:24-25.
The Debtor’s pre-mediation document production, public documents, and POC Abuse
Claim assertions suggest that the Debtor’s officials had knowledge of the following alleged
perpetrators’ propensities for sexual abuse of children, before or during the LMI periods of
coverage:
i. Fr. Henry Blaszczynski: Diocesan priest, Msgr. Ryan, made a report to Bishop Guilfoyle
in 1968 that Blaszczynski was abusing children (See Ex. 19(f) to Sugayan Dec., at DOCINS_066013) (IE at 0081).
ii. Fr. William Bleiler: Bleiler was allegedly removed from his assignment after abuse was
reported to the Debtor in 1984 (See POC 432).
iii. Fr. Gerald P. Clements: Clements was transferred after letters were received by Bishop
Guilfoyle in November 1973, requesting he be transferred “in the best interests of
parishioners” (See Ex. 19(g) to Sugayan Dec., at DOC-INS_010310) (IE at 0081).
iv. Fr. Norman Connelly: There are allegations that the Debtor was aware Connelly was
abusing children as early as 1972 (See POC 371/384).
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v. Fr. Charles Davis: Fr. Davis requested and was granted a one-year leave of absence in
October 1970 (See Ex. 19(h) to Sugayan Dec., at DOC-INS_013170) (IE at 0081). Also,
a Diocesan priest stated that the boys at St. Luke, where Fr. Davis served as an Associate
Pastor in or around September 1962, knew at the time to stay away from Fr. Davis (See Ex.
19(h) to Sugayan Dec., at DOC-INS_013178) (IE at 0081).
vi. Fr. Harry Geisenhoffer: Took a leave of absence on September 1, 1972 and was laicized
on July 13, 1973 (See Ex. 19(i) to Sugayan Dec., at DOC-INS_036199) (IE at 0081).
vii. Fr. Richard Gerbino: In a 2019 lawsuit, the Debtor acknowledged Bishop Celestine
Damiano received a report in 1962 that Fr. Gerbino committed child abuse (See Ex. 19(a)
to Sugayan Dec., at DOC-INS_062256) (IE at 0081).
viii. Fr. Jesus Danilo Giraldo: A 1974 letter from the Archbishop of Tunja to Bishop Guillfoyle
mentioned that Giraldo had “moral difficulties” (See Ex. 19(j) to Sugayan Dec., at DOCINS_045089) (IE at 0081).
ix. Fr. Thomas Harkins: Fr. Harkins took a one year leave of absence starting on June 7, 1978,
and was allegedly treated for allegations of sexual misconduct during this time (See POC
506).
x. Fr. John Kelly: The Debtor was allegedly aware of Fr. Kelly’s propensity to commit child
sexual abuse in 1979-1980 (See POC 465).
xi. Fr. Joseph Shannon: Fr. Shannon allegedly abused children and the Debtor was allegedly
aware of this in 1967 (See POC 467).
xii. Fr. John Smith: Fr. Smith was allegedly reassigned twice before 1977 due to suspicions
that he was a sexual abuser (See POC 383).
xiii. Fr. Patrick Weaver: A lawsuit accusing Fr. Weaver of sexual abuse asserted the Debtor
learned Weaver was an abuser in 1966 but took no action. (See BishopAccountability.org,
https://www.bishop-accountability.org/accused/wea ver-patrick-j-1963/, last accessed
Feb. 14, 2022).
The following POC allege abuse by one of the above perpetrators after the evidence shows
the Debtor to have been aware of the perpetrator’s misconduct: 63, 122, 124, 134, 135, 140, 144,
149, 152, 157, 165, 176/178, 196/386, 198, 225, 227, 228, 231, 232, 235, 245, 271, 276, 354, 355,
369, 371/384, 381-383, 385, 426, 431, 435, 439, 456, 462, 465, 467, 470, 478, 479, 496 and 506.
LMI have no liability for any of these POC Abuse Claims.
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No Coverage for Punitive Damages.

New Jersey law, as a matter of public policy, precludes insurance coverage for punitive
damages. See Johnson & Johnson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 285 N.J. Super. 575, 584 (App. Div.
1995).
viii.

Late Notice.

The Debtor must have given LMI timely notice of the claim. Comiter Depo. (IE at 0004),
34:25-25:1; Exhibit 1 at 13.
The Package Policies provide: “[t]he Assured shall immediately notify Underwriters...of
any occurrence, the cost of which is likely to result in payment by the Underwriters under this
Insurance” and “[w]henever the Assured has information from which the Assured may
reasonably conclude that an occurrence covered under Section II of this Insurance involves
injuries or damages, notice shall be given to [the insurer]... as soon as practicable”. See, e.g.,
Baker Depo., Exhibit 3, at 26 of 37 (“Notice of Occurrence”); Ex. 17 to Sugayan Dec., at
LMI000479 (IE at 0079); Answer, at 20 (IE at 1002).
The following POC Abuse Claims allege that the respective POC Abuse Claimant
notified the Debtor of their allegations of abuse, but LMI did not receive notice of their claims
until the filing of the POC in the bankruptcy proceeding: 61, 63, 109, 127, 128, 163, 165, 170,
183, 198, 202, 227, 254, 320, 374, 381, 382, 385, 456, 499 and 506, which may give rise to a
late notice defense. This may, with further information, show that the claim may have also been
released as part of the 2010 Agreement.
LMI reserved rights to assert other coverage defenses. Any one or more of these defenses
would diminish or extinguish any liability LMI might have to the Debtor.
The POC Abuse Claimants and the Committee provided no evidence to the contrary as to
any of these coverage defenses. Given the Assureds’ defenses to liability and LMI’ defenses to
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coverage, there is no guarantee that the result of litigation would be more favorable to the Debtor
than the proposed terms of the Settlement Agreement. On the other hand, approval of the
Settlement Agreement provides compensation and certainty to the POC Abuse Claimants, and
provides the Debtor with additional funds to remit to POC Abuse Claims while, at the same time,
avoiding the need for POC Abuse Claims to litigate the POC Abuse Claims in the tort system.
The evidence supporting the existence of coverage defenses includes (1) the LMI Policies;
(2) the Sugayan Declaration; (3) the Wilen Depo; (4) the Comiter expert report; (5) the Scarcella
expert report; (6) POC Abuse Claim Nos. 166, 220, 256, 351 and 440; (7) POC Abuse Claim Nos.
96 (101), 111 (112), 118, 124, 131 (132), 134, 142, 189, 239, 271, 343, 375, 376, 388/389, 451
and 517; (8) POC Abuse Claim Nos. 82, 125, 141, 163, 176 (178), 198, 200, 209, 221, 226, 229,
235, 276, 354, 371 (384), 382, 388 (398), 418, 467, 477, 497, 499, 511 and 541; (9) POC Abuse
Claim Nos. 63, 122, 124, 134, 135, 140, 144, 149, 152, 157, 165, 176/178, 196/386, 198, 225, 227,
228, 231, 232, 235, 245, 271, 276, 354, 355, 369, 371/384, 381-383, 385, 426, 431, 435, 439, 456,
462, 465, 467, 470, 478, 479, 496 and 506; (10) POC Abuse Claim Nos. 85/449, 139, 143, 171,
173, 209, 212, 213, 220, 229, 244, 255, 256, 267, 272, 276, 281/420, 416, 418, 419, 423, 433, 436,
447, 453, 460, 469, 476, 479, 482, 506, 513; (11) Subparts (i) – (xiii) of subparagraph III.A.1.b.
(vi); (12) POC Abuse Claim Nos. 61, 63, 109, 127, 128, 163, 165, 170, 183, 198, 202, 227, 254,
320, 374, 381, 382, 385, 456, 499 and 506.
2.

Factor 2--The Likely Difficulties in Collection.

In the event litigation in the Adversary Proceeding is protracted, further insurer
insolvencies may occur, thereby making it difficult, if not impossible, to collect any proceeds under
the applicable policies. Approval of the Settlement Agreement would prevent such collection
difficulties.
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As discussed, supra, the liability of each LMI is several, not joint. Moreover, LMI do not
pay the several shares of insolvent insurers who subscribed the LMI Policies. Chem. Leaman Tank
Lines, 177 F.3d at 219. Certain insurers subscribing the LMI Policies are already insolvent,
including Bellefonte Insurance Company and Pine Top Insurance Company. See Sugayan Dec.,
Doc. 1293-15; Baker Depo. (IE at 0005), 97:22-98:5; Comiter Depo. (IE at 0004), Exhibit 1 at 10
(Bellefonte Insurance Company Ltd. and Pine Top Insurance Company Ltd.). The Court can take
judicial notice of the facts that during the Diocese of Winona’s bankruptcy case, two insurers
subscribing policies in the London market, Stronghold Insurance Company, Limited, and CX
Reinsurance Company, Limited, entered administration in England, and filed chapter 15 cases in
New York. See Adv. Proc. No. 18-03094 (Bankr. D. Minn.), entitled Diocese of WinonaRochester v. U.S. Fire Insurance Co., et al., in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota,
Dkt. 56, and 62. Neither insurer contributed to the LMI settlement in that case.
Given that neither the POC Abuse Claimants nor the Committee provided any contrary
evidence, the Court should find that Martin factor 2 weighs in favor of approving the Settlement
Agreement.
3.

Factor 3--The Complexity of the Litigation Involved, and the Expense,
Inconvenience and Delay Necessarily Attending It.

Litigation of the issues in the Adversary Proceeding will be complex, costly, and lengthy.
The Court need only take judicial notice of the docket in the Adversary Proceeding to find this. In
addition, the Plan Proponents own expert’s testimony supports this point.
Although no material issues have been resolved, the Adversary Proceeding has not been
quiescent. On January 19, 2021, the Committee filed a letter stating that it “respectively requests
that the Court decline to refer to this adversary proceeding to mediation at this time”. Adversary
Proceeding, Dkt. 19. The Committee further requested “the Court permit the Committee to
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immediately serve discovery in the adversary proceeding so it can fully understand the full scope
of insurance coverage available”. Id. The Committee filed a Motion to Exempt the Adversary
Proceeding from Mediation on February 10, 2021. Adversary Proceeding, Dkt. 30. In the
Committee’s response to the oppositions from Insurers and the Debtor’s cross-motion the
Committee stated, “[T]he Committee has only been able to secure the production of some
documents by serving Rule 9016 Subpoenas on the Insurers and certain other Catholic entities”.
See Adversary Proceeding, Dkt. 63, filed March 3, 2021, ¶ 7. The Committee further stated
“[d[iscovery was necessitated because the Insurers failed and refused to produce a single document
in response to informal information requests made during the prior [2020] mediation”. Id., ¶ 8.
The Court’s joint scheduling order provided certain discovery deadlines for the Debtor to respond
to the Committee’s requests, and for the Insurers to respond to the Committee’s Rule 9016
Subpoenas. See Adversary Proceeding, Dkt. 102, issued April 20, 2022. During the mediation
(after the first rounds), the Court entered an amended joint scheduling order, extending certain
discovery deadlines. See Adversary Proceeding, Dkt. 113, issued October 8, 2021.
On May 5, 2021, LMI moved pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 7016-1(e) for a
determination that the Court may not adjudicate count I of the First Amended Complaint to final
judgment, Adversary Proceeding, Dkt. 85, which was joined by other Insurers. The Committee
and the Debtor filed a joint objection to that motion on May 5, 2021. Adversary Proceeding. Dkt.
107. That motion remains pending.
On November 5, 2021, the Debtor’s counsel emailed the Court requesting a stay of
discovery in the Adversary Proceeding on behalf of the Insurers and the Debtor pursuant to a
settlement (this email is not on the docket, but it is referenced in the letter mentioned in the next
sentence and in the Court’s order dated November 16, 2021, extending the deadline to amend the
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pleadings and add parties. Adversary Proceeding, Dkt. 118). The Committee responded by filing
a letter with the Court on November 9, 2021. Adversary Proceeding, Dkt. 115. The Debtor filed
a reply letter on November 10, 2021. Adversary Proceeding, Dkt. 116, and insurers filed a joint
letter on November 15, 2021. Dkt. 117. On January 5, 2022, the Court entered an order staying
the Adversary Proceeding.
As Shakespeare wrote, “What's past is prologue”. The activities described above took
almost a year before the stay was imposed. Much time and expense were involved and no material
progress was made. That history is a preview of what would happen if that litigation is resumed.
LMI have pleaded thirty-nine defenses to coverage. Each of those defenses must be
resolved by the Court. Some of those defenses can be resolved as matters of law based on briefing
and argument. However, some of the coverage defenses will require extensive discovery.
The “expected and intended” defense will require extensive discovery. Subparagraph
(III)(A)(1)(b)(vi) lists thirteen alleged perpetrators. Certain documents indicate that the Debtor
may have known about their propensities for sexual abuse of children, before or during the LMI
periods of coverage. The resolution of this defense will require depositions of officials and
representatives of the Debtor and any surviving alleged perpetrators, as well as the POC Abuse
Claimants. Requests for production of documents will be required. Motions for partial summary
judgment will be prepared, filed, and argued. Given the typical discovery disputes – such as have
occurred in this bankruptcy case – and the inherent delays associated with such disputes,
substantial time and expense will be required to resolve the “expected and intended” defense.
There is no coverage for false or fraudulent claims. As discussed above in III.A.1., there
are numerous POC Abuse Claims against priests who have no other claims made against them and
no evidence of misconduct has ever been reported against them, and numerous POC Abuse Claims
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are insufficiently detailed to determine who the alleged abuser was. According to Mr. Wilen, 67
POC Abuse Claims are subject to partial or complete defenses. Wilen Depo. (IE at 0001), Exhibit
6 at 20-28. All claims that appear suspicious or unlikely will have to be examined in detail before
coverage can be determined for them. Once again, document requests would be required, along
with depositions of the POC Abuse Claimants, the officials of the Debtor, and any surviving
alleged perpetrators. Once again, motions for partial summary judgment will be prepared, filed,
and argued. Once again, substantial time and expense would be required.
Even the coverage defenses that do not require discovery cannot be decided quickly. Each
must be briefed and argued to the Court, presumably as motions for partial summary judgment.
There are a number of multifaceted issues, many of which may be matters of first impression in
this District. Scarcella Depo. Exhibit 1 at 11-16 (IE at 0002). Certain issues may require a jury to
resolve, so those defenses would have to be tried in the District Court. There would almost
certainly be an appeal from a final order. Such litigation would burden the Trust with additional
administrative expenses. It is improbable that the Adversary Proceeding could be resolved in less
than three years after great expenditure of the litigants’ and the Court’s time, and even more time
could be required.
The cost of litigating the Abuse Claims is significant.

Evidence submitted by the

Committee suggests that resolving the claim litigation alone could cost over $60 million. Baker
Depo. (IE at 0005), 129:13-17. In such event, that amount paid by the insurers would not inure to
the benefit of the POC Abuse Claimants.
Although each case is different, other diocesan cases may be informative of what is to be
expected in the event coverage litigation were to proceed:


In the Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., the underlying abuse claim
was filed in 1989. Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 841 F. Supp.
47
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894, 895 (D. Minn. 1992). It was tried to a jury from October 1990 to December
1990, and the jury awarded damages to the plaintiff. The plaintiff and the Debtor
both appealed, and the Court of Appeals of Minnesota affirmed on March 24, 1992.
Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 482 N.W.2d 806 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992). In May 15, 1992, the Minnesota Supreme Court denied review. The
coverage litigation was initially filed in 1990. See Diocese of Winona, 841 F. Supp.
at 895. The litigation was still ongoing in September 1996, seven years after the
abuse claim was filed, when the Eighth Circuit remanded the case to the District
Court and denied the Debtor’s petition for rehearing. Diocese of Winona v.
Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F. 3d 1386 (8th Cir. 1996).


In Chicago Ins. Co. v. Archdiocese of St. Louis, 2012 WL 5932622 (E.D. Mo. Nov.
27, 2012), the underlying abuse claim was filed on June 10, 2003. The plaintiff and
the Debtor settled on February 16, 2007. The insurer filed its first amended
complaint against the Archdiocese on June 29, 2009. The case was appealed to the
Eighth Circuit, and resolved when the Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s
decision and denied the petition for rehearing on March 6, 2014, eleven years after
the abuse case was filed. Chicago Ins. Co. v. Archdiocese of St. Louis, 740 F.3d
1197 (8th Cir. 2014).



In Interstate Fire & Casualty Co. v. Diocese of Phoenix, the underlying abuse
claims were filed on December 3, 2003, March 23, 2004, and January 27, 2005.
Interstate Fire & Cas. Co. v. Roman Cath. Church of the Diocese of Phoenix ex rel.
Olmsted, 2011 WL 587163 (D. Ariz. Feb. 8, 2011). The Debtor settled all
underlying lawsuits before December 12, 2008, when it submitted a claim to the
insurer for excess coverage. Interstate filed a coverage litigation on July 2, 2009.
After appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit remanded it to the District Court
on July 30, 2014. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co. v. Diocese of Phoenix, 761 F.3d
953 (9th Cir. 2014). The litigation was resolved in November 2014 when the
District Court entered a final judgment, eleven years after the abuse claim was filed.
See Final Judgment, ECF No. 296, Interstate Fire & Cas. Co. v. Roman Cath.
Church of the Diocese of Phoenix, 2:09CV01405.



In Interstate Fire & Cas. Co. v. Cath. Diocese of El Paso, the underlying abuse
claim was filed in 2009. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co. v. Cath. Diocese of El Paso,
2014 WL 1117284, (W.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2014). The parties settled the lawsuit in
January 2012. Interstate filed a coverage action in state court in May 2012, which
was removed to federal court in June 2012. Notice of Removal, Interstate Fire &
Cas. Co. v. Cath. Diocese of El Paso, 2012 WL 2359734 (W.D. Tex. June 8, 2012).
After appeal to the Fifth Circuit, in August 2015, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
District Court’s decision, six years after the abuse claim was filed. Interstate Fire
& Cas. Co. v. Cath. Diocese of El Paso, 622 F. App'x 418 (5th Cir. 2015).

The Committee concedes that it would take years and could cost over a million dollars to
litigate coverage. Baker Depo., 175:17-177:8. But, in this they are unwontedly optimistic. Once
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again, while not binding, experience in other cases is informative. See, e.g, In re Archdiocese of
Portland, Case No. 04-37154, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Oregon, in
which coverage counsel billed $3.656 million in fees; see Dkt. 5485; In re Diocese of Duluth, Case
No. 15-50792, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota, in which
coverage counsel billed over $1.8 million as of March 2022, and which litigation is ongoing, see
Dkts. 218, 261, 284, 312, 334, 350, 367, 438; and In re Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville
Centre, New York, Case No. 20-12345, pending in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York, which was filed contemporaneously with this case, and in which
coverage counsel has billed $3,851,139.50 as of July 2022 (discovery is still ongoing). See Dkts.
456, 699, 908, 1022, 1204.
In contrast, approval of the Settlement Agreement eliminates future litigation costs, which,
absent approval of the Settlement Agreement, would be borne by a post-confirmation Trust. It
also increases the funds available to pay POC Abuse Claimants, as it provides for an additional
$30 million to be contributed to the Trust for their benefit. Further, the Settlement Agreement is
a critical component of the Insurer Supported Plan, without which the greatly increased proposed
funding of the Trust - from $26.16 million to $90 million - would not have occurred. Resolving
the individual POC Abuse Claims against the Assureds, and the Assureds’ claims and the defenses
thereto asserted by LMI in the Adversary Proceeding, would be a costly and protracted undertaking
that could deplete that would otherwise be used to pay POC Abuse Claimants, without any
guaranty of a favorable outcome. Baker Depo., 175:17-177:8.
Consequently, the Settlement Agreement results in payments to POC Abuse Claimants
significantly exceeding the average diocesan and religious order bankruptcies, and exceeding by
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multiples the average prior payments by the Debtor to Abuse Claimants. See Comiter Report at
Appendix H; (IE at 0004).
In light of (i) the uncertainty surrounding the ultimate outcome of litigation, (ii) the
certainty of additional delay and costs, (iii) the risk that delay may mean that some of the POC
Abuse Claimants will not live long enough to benefit from a positive litigation outcome, and (iv)
the near certainty that protracted litigation costs would actually reduce the funds available for
distribution, this factor strongly favors approval of the Settlement Agreement.
The evidence in support of this Factor 3 includes: (1) the LMI Policies; (2) the docket,
pleadings, and papers filed in the Adversary Proceeding; (3) the Sugayan Declaration; (4) the
Comiter Depo; (5) the Scarcella Depo.; (6) the Baker Depo.; and (7) judicial notice of the other
diocesan cases cited.
4.

Factor 4--The Paramount Interest of the Creditors.

The paramount interest of creditors test was recently and succinctly defined: “A plan
settlement satisfies this factor when the settlement was the result of arm’s length and good-faith
negotiations and where the settlement provides tangible and intangible benefits”.

In re

Mallinckrodt PLC, 639 B.R. 837, 864 (Bankr. D. Del. 2022); see also In re W.R. Grace & Co.,
475 B.R. 34, 79 (D. Del. 2012) (“This infusion of tangible and abstract value into Grace's
bankruptcy estate, in turn, is in the paramount interest of Grace's creditors because it enlarges the
pool of funds available to all creditors and ensures greater guaranteed recovery.”); In re Nortel
Networks, Inc., 522 B.R. 491, 517–18 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014); In re Capmark Fin. Grp. Inc., 438
B.R. 471, 520 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010). It also satisfies this factor when “[n]ot approving the
settlement could benefit creditors only if the net recovery eventually received would be greater
than offered by the settlement, an entirely speculative and uncertain prospect.” Kranzdorf v.
Green, 76 B.R. 974, 979 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
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The Settlement Agreement satisfies the test as set forth in Mallinckrodt. First, the
settlement was at arm’s length and in good faith as described in the Introduction and in Section
II.D. above. The Settling Parties participated in multiple mediation sessions, including eight full
days of in-person mediation sessions.
Second, the Settlement Agreement confers substantial “tangible benefits”; approval of the
Settlement Agreement will result in an approved chapter 11 plan paying $90 million the Trust for
the benefit of the POC Abuse Claimants.
Third, the Settlement Agreement provides substantial “intangible benefits”; the POC
Abuse Claimants can be paid after Plan confirmation, rather than waiting years for litigation in the
tort system; POC Abuse Claimants will be paid under Trust Distribution Procedures approved by
this Court, rather than going through trial with payment subject to jury decisions; funding will be
made available without litigation of coverage issues against the Certain Settling Insurers, which
would add more delay and uncertainty; and POC Abuse Claimants will be able to maintain their
privacy. In addition, the Settlement Agreement benefits the Debtor’s trade creditors and other
creditor constituencies because it allows the insurer Supported Plan to proceed to confirmation in
the short term, rather than waiting for the issues in the Adversary Proceeding to be fully and finally
litigated.
“[W]hen reviewing a trustee's proposed compromise under Rule 9019, a bankruptcy court
is simply concerned that the accord fall within the range of reasonableness from the estate's point
of view, not from the point of view of third parties.” In re Found. for New Era Philanthropy, 1996
Bankr. LEXIS 1892, at *60 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 1996).
“There is no per se rule that the views of a committee or other creditors are dispositive on
the reasonableness of a settlement. A per se rule would unduly expose the Debtors to the demands
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of creditors preferring to risk estate assets in a litigation lottery or litigate under blackmail or
strong-arm strategies.” In re Capmark Fin. Grp. Inc., 438 B.R. 471, 519-20 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010).
Further, a settlement is in the best interest of creditors when it resolves litigation that would
encumber, overburden, or diminish assets that could otherwise be used to pay creditors. In re
Roper & Twardowsky, LLC, 559 B.R. 375, 399 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2016) (a settlement that reduces the
total amount of claims against the estate was in the best interest of all creditors); In re Grand Prix
Assocs., No. 09-16545 (DHS), 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 1779, at *20-21 (Bankr. D.N.J. June 26, 2009)
(holding that settlement was in the paramount interest of creditors where, absent a settlement, the
litigation of unsettled issues would be immense and time consuming.); Wash. Mut., Inc. v. Griffin,
848 F. App'x 84, 88 (3d Cir. 2021) (a settlement that reduced the pro rata share of the initial
distribution but increased the odds of an additional payout by eliminating a $24 million senior
claim was in the paramount interest of creditors.); In re SS Body Armor I, Inc., 2021 Bankr. LEXIS
1527, at *17-18 (Bankr. D. Del. June 7, 2021) (holding that because litigation that would have
occurred absent settlement would be extensive and without easy resolution, and because the delay
and cost of such litigation outweighed any potential benefits, the fourth Martin factor was
satisfied.)
Thus, approval of the Settlement Agreement will advance this case toward confirmation of
an Insurer Supported Plan, which will allow POC Abuse Claimants and other creditors to receive
compensation much sooner than they could expect, if the Adversary Proceeding were litigated to
conclusion with LMI and the other Certain Settling Insurers and their Abuse Claims resolved in
the tort system.
The evidence in support of Factor 4 includes: (1) the Settlement Agreement, (2) the LMI
Policies, and (3) the docket, pleadings, and papers filed in the Adversary Proceeding.
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The Settlement Agreement Merits Approval under Sections 363(b), (f), and
(m).

Section 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor in possession to “use, sell, or lease,
other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate” after “notice and a hearing”.
11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1). Approval of a proposed sale of property pursuant to section 363(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code is appropriate if the transaction represents a reasonable exercise of business
judgment on the part of the debtor. See e.g., In re Congoleum Corp., 2007 WL 1428477, at *2
(Bankr. D.N.J. May 11, 2007). Courts show great deference when applying the business judgment
standard. See Sheehan v. Dobin, 2011 WL 1627051, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2011); In re Martin,
91 F.3d at 395 (courts defer to a trustee’s judgment concerning use of property under §363(b)
when there is a legitimate business justification); In re Glob. Home Prod., LLC, 369 B.R. 778, 784
(Bankr. D. Del. 2007).
Courts generally consider four factors in considering whether sound business
judgment exists: (1) whether there is a sound business reason for the sale; (2)
whether the sale is proposed in good faith; (3) whether adequate and reasonable
notice has been afforded; and (4) whether a fair and reasonable purchase price is
offered.”
In re Sea Oaks Country Club, LLC, 2020 WL 6588412, at *10 (Bankr. D.N.J. Nov. 10, 2020).
Here, all four factors weigh in favor of approving the Settlement Agreement.
1.

There Are Sound Business Reasons to Enter the Settlement Agreement.
a.

The Committee has Failed to Meet its Burden of Proving that
the Debtor did not Exercise Sound Business Judgment.

The Committee states that, “The only evidence currently in the record establishes the
absence of any exercise of business judgment by the Debtor”. Motion in Limine of the Official
Committee of Tort Claimant Creditors to Preclude the Debtor from Offering Any Evidence Not
Produced in Discovery, Dkt. 1446 (“Committee’s MIL”), at 6. However, the Committee misstates
the standard.
53
DM3\8525874.5

Case 20-21257-JNP

Doc 2478 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 19:30:40
Document
Page 62 of 80

Desc Main

“The legal standard applicable to both §§ 363(b) and 365(a) is the business judgment test,
under which a bankruptcy court will authorize debtor-initiated actions if the debtor shows that ‘a
sound business purpose justifies’ such actions”. City of Rockford v. Mallinckrodt PLC (In re
Mallinckrodt PLC), No. 21-167-LPS, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54785, at *19 (D. Del. Mar. 28,
2022) (citations omitted). There is no dispute that New Jersey law governs the settlement.
“The New Jersey business judgment rule requires ‘fraud, self-dealing or unconscionable conduct’
before a director’s business decision may be challenged”. Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Hovnanian, Civ.
No. 94-450 (HLS), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19359, at *16-17 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 1994) (citing Maul
v. Kirkman, 270 N.J. Super. 596, 637 A.2d 928, 937 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994); Papalexiou
v. Tower West Condominium, 167 N.J. Super. 516, 401 A.2d 280, 285-286 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1979); Asarco Inc. v. Court, 611 F. Supp. 468, 473 (D.N.J. 1985); 3 J. MacKay, New Jersey
Business Corporations § 12.33 at 12-58 (2d ed. 1992)). The Committee has introduced no
evidence of the Debtor’s fraud, self-dealing, or unconscionable conduct. Hence, the Court should
defer to that business judgment.
“Indeed, ‘[w]here the [debtor-in-possession] articulates a reasonable basis for the business
decision, courts will generally not entertain objections’.”. City of Rockford v. Mallinckrodt PLC
(In re Mallinckrodt PLC), No. 21-167-LPS, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54785, at *19 (D. Del. Mar.
28, 2022) (citing Chamberlain v. Stanziale (In re Chamberlain), 545 B.R. 827, 844 (D. Del.
2016).; see also Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 348 B.R. 136, 162 (D. Del. 2006) (courts
"uniformly defer[] to the” debtor under § 365(a)).
The Debtor articulated not just one, but four valid business justifications for the sale:
First, the Sale is a crucial element of the Settlement, as the Certain Settling Insurers
required the Sale as part of the Settlement to ensure finality with respect to the
Subject Insurance Policies. Second, the Settlement Agreement will result in the
Diocese’s estate receiving the Settlement Amount in cash proceeds to fund the
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Trust for resolution of Tort Claims. Third, the Subject Insurance Policies’ value
could decrease over time. Fourth, litigation regarding coverage for Tort Claims
carries significant risk and would involve lengthy delays and additional costs.
These delays would result in additional administrative expenses for the estate,
which would thereby lower the Diocese’s ability to contribute to the Trust.
Accordingly, the Diocese has articulated a valid business justification for the Sale.
See Original 9019 Motion, at 19.
Hence, the Debtor is presumed to have exercised sound business judgment, until evidence
is produced indicating that the Debtor did not exercise sound business judgment. Official Comm.
for Unsecured Creditors v. Aust (In re Network Access Sols., Corp.), 330 B.R. 67, 75 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2005) (emphasis added); In re Tower Air, Inc., 416 F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir. 2005)
(“Overcoming the presumptions of the business judgment rule on the merits is a near-Herculean
task.”). In fact, “‘[b]usiness judgment’ is defined as ‘the presumption that in making business
decisions not involving direct self-interest or self-dealing, corporate directors act on an informed
basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that their actions are in the corporation's best interest.’”
In re Network Access Sols., Corp., 330 B.R. at 75 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 212 (8th ed.
2004) (emphasis added). The presumption places the burden on the Committee to introduce
evidence of the Debtor’s lack of business judgment, which the Committee has failed to do. It is
not the Debtor’s burden to prove up its business judgment absent the Committee introducing such
contrary evidence. While the Committee objected to the 9019 Motion, it failed to produce any
evidence that the Debtor did not exercise sound business judgment for entering into the Settlement
Agreement. Therefore, the presumption that the Debtor exercised sound business judgment is
uncontested.
Discovery on the 9019 Motion is closed, save for discovery regarding the alleged “changed
circumstances” issue. All witnesses have been identified; the experts deposed; all exhibits
identified (except as may be required for the “changed circumstances” issue). The Committee has
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failed to produce any evidence – and now cannot produce any evidence – that the Debtor did not
exercise sound business judgment.
b.

There is ample evidence in the record to support the business
judgment test.

The Committee argues that “the Diocese has not proffered any relevant, admissible
evidence to support its Insurance Settlement Motion.” This statement is undeniably incorrect – it
is hyperbole.
The insurance policies of all insurers have been produced and will be available for the
hearing on the 9019 Motion. The LMI policies show that the Debtor defending all abuse cases
brought in the tort system and allowing LMI to associate in that defense is a condition to insurance
coverage. That is, if the abuse claimants are permitted to sue in the state courts, the Debtor must
defend, and failing to defend will result in the loss of coverage. Such defense would be immensely
expensive and would take many years to complete if all the abuse claimants sue in the state courts.
Only when the defense of cases is complete would LMI be compelled to reimburse the Debtor assuming that coverage exists – and the Debtor would still have to absorb the SIR for each
occurrence. The certainty of the time and expense of this litigation would obviously be a major
factor in the Debtor’s decision to settle with the insurers.
If abuse claims go into the tort system and the Debtor is required to defend, the Debtor will
be in litigation for years to come, which the Chapter 11 case was filed to prevent. More
worryingly, legitimate abuse claimants will have to wait many years before they recover any
damages for the abuse they suffered. This factor supports the Debtor’s business judgment to settle
with the insurers.
In addition, the wording in the LMI insurance policies describe coverage defenses that LMI
hold, for example, the expected and intended defense. The Committee’s own expert, Tom Baker,
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testified that the cost of resolving coverage defenses could be in the millions. See Deposition
Transcript of Professor Thomas Baker at 176:8-177:8. That cost would favor the Settlement
Agreement and would satisfy the business judgment test.
The Independent Victim Compensation Program, where consensual payments were made
to abuse claimants, also supports the valuation under the Settlement Agreement, as does the
testimony of Mr. Wilen, which supports the Debtor’s business judgment to settle with the insurers.
The expert testimony of Mr. Scarcella and Ms. Comiter further support the Settlement Agreement
– not only have their reports been produced, the Committee deposed them and is fully aware that
their testimony supports the Settlement Agreement. There are other factors, as well, but the
foregoing are ample to refute the Committee’s unsupported statement that “the Diocese has not
proffered any relevant, admissible evidence to support its Insurance Settlement Motion”.
Committee’s MIL at 2.
The Settlement Agreement will enable the Trust to increase the amounts that it pays the
POC Abuse Claimants under its Plan by $30 million. This amount exceeds what the insurers,
including LMI, would pay in the tort system, where there would be no opportunity to obtain
finality. See, generally, Section I, supra. Moreover, the Settlement Agreement will provide for
an Insurer Supported Plan that will discharge the Debtor from any liability for Abuse Claims and
enable it to move forward with its mission without the distraction of ongoing litigation.
The Court’s approval of the Settlement Agreement would ensure that the Trust would not
only avoid years of litigation and millions of dollars in litigation expenses, see Section III(A)(3),
supra; Scarcella Depo. (IE at 0002), Exhibit 1; id., 44:3-15: but would realize value for the
insurance policies that the Assureds could not obtain outside of bankruptcy.
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Litigation regarding coverage for the POC Abuse Claims carries significant risk. Scarcella
Depo. (IE at 0002), 43:18-43:22; 94:12-14, 21-24; 95:7-17; 213:3-25. Approval of the Settlement
Agreement avoids such risk and would add $30 million from the Certain Settling Insurers, for the
benefit of POC Abuse Claimants. Scarcella Depo. (IE at 0002), 79:3-80:8. Accordingly, the
Debtor has articulated a valid business justification for the Settlement Agreement.
2.

The Settlement Agreement Was Proposed in Good Faith.

The Certain Settling Insurers are good faith purchasers.
The Bankruptcy Code does not define “good faith purchaser”. “Courts applying section
363(m) (and its predecessor, Fed. R. Bankr. P. 805) have, therefore, turned to traditional equitable
principles, holding that the phrase encompasses one who purchases in ‘good faith’ and for
‘value’”. In re Abbotts Dairies of Pennsylvania, Inc., 788 F.2d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 1986).
“The requirement that a purchaser act in good faith ... speaks to the integrity of his
conduct in the course of the sale proceedings. Typically, the misconduct that would
destroy a purchaser's good faith status at a judicial sale involves fraud, collusion
between the purchaser and other bidders or the trustee, or an attempt to take grossly
unfair advantage of other bidders”.
Id., 788 F.2d at 147–48 (citations omitted).
The Settlement Agreement is the culmination of multiple mediation sessions, over several
months, conducted at arms-length, by a well-credentialed, independent, fair mediator, with a
distinguished national reputation. There is no evidence of fraud or collusion on behalf of any
mediation party. The Settlement Agreement was agreed in good faith, and the Certain Settling
Insurers are entitled to the protections afforded to a good faith purchaser under Bankruptcy Code
section 363(m).
3.

Adequate and Reasonable Notice Has Been Provided to Known and
Unknown Creditors.
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Adequate and reasonable notice of the hearing on the 9019 Motion to approve the
Settlement Agreement, and of the time to object, has been provided to both known and unknown
creditors.
In Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., the Supreme Court held that for notice to
satisfy due process it must be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections”. Id., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950) (calling notice “[a]n
elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded
finality”.).
“Bankruptcy law divides creditors into two groups for purposes of notice: known and
unknown creditors”. In re Freedom Communs. Holdings, Inc., 472 B.R. 257, 261 (Bankr. D. Del.
2012). “Known creditors must generally be provided actual written notice of a debtor's bankruptcy
filing and the bar claims date in the case”. See Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Tessler (In re J.A. Jones,
Inc.), 492 F.3d 242, 249 (4th Cir. 2007) (contrasting known creditors from unknown creditors, for
whom constructive notice is constitutionally sufficient). “[I]in the case of persons missing or
unknown, employment of an indirect and even a probably futile means of notification is all that
the situation permits and creates no constitutional bar to a final decree foreclosing their rights”.
Mullane, 339 U.S. 306, 317. As the Court has recognized, there is an “abundance of case law
suggesting that notice by publication is generally sufficient for unknown creditors”. Sweeney v.
Lafayette Pharm., Inc., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75625, at *10 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2020) (citing
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314; Davis, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74261, 2013 WL 2297185, at *7;
Notice of the hearing on the Settlement Agreement and the opportunity to object were
mailed to all known creditors of the Debtor, and were publicized both locally and nationally for
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unknown POC Abuse Claimants. See Affidavit of Service, Doc, 1246 (serving notice of the 9019
Motion); Affidavit of Publication, Doc. 1329 (verifying that the 9019 Motion was sent for
publication). Hence, notice will be both reasonable and adequate.
4.

LMI are paying a fair and reasonable purchase price to buy back the
LMI Policies.

This factor favors approval of the Settlement Agreement.
The totality of the $30 million Insurance Contribution provided for in the Settlement
Agreement will go to the Trust established by an Insurer Supported Plan. The division of that
amount into a “Buy-Back Payment” and a “Plan Payment” is of no moment, because all of the
money goes ultimately to the POC Abuse Claimants. Under Section 363, the POC Abuse Claims
will attach to the $30 million Insurance Contribution once it is deposited in the Trust. The sale is
free and clear of the POC Abuse Claims, and the Court will be requested to enter a bar order, as is
typically done for Section 363 sales. Thus, the world will be enjoined from suing the Certain
Settling Insurers with respect to the Subject Insurance Policies. The Plan Payment is technically
for the channeling injunction, but in this case it is of little actual value, as any claims would already
be enjoined by the bar order. The theoretical value is to enjoin contribution claims, but, as all
insurers are settling, there will be no such claims. Hence, the entire value of the insurers’ payment
is to repurchase the insurance policies.
Ms. McNally’s opinion concerned the gross value of all the Abuse Claims, not taking into
account coverage defenses and not allocating claims to the various insurers’ policies. Declaration
of Kathryn R. McNally (“McNally Depo.”) (IE at 0003), Exhibit 1. Hence, her testimony does not
go to the reasonableness of the Settlement Agreement.
Mr. Baker opined that the Buy-Back Payments in the total amount of “$15 million” were
not reasonable. However, as discussed in the Motion in Limine regarding his testimony, he never
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quantified an actual value of the buy-back, and he was unable to assign any value to the “legacy
claims” or the “uncapped indemnification”, which represented the value of the buy-back, in his
opinion. Thus, even if $15 million were the correct buy-back amount, it is far greater than the $0
number that Mr. Baker put forward.
Ms. Comiter considered five different models in her analysis. Comiter Depo. (IE at 0004),
Exhibit 1. The first two were based on the Debtor’s valuation, done by Mr. Wilen. Id. The first
model was based on Mr. Wilen’s valuation of $34.4 million. Id. The second model grossed that
number up to the actual value of the settlement, $90 million. Id. The third model was based on
the Debtor’s historical payments under the IVCP. Id. The fourth model was based on applying
the maximum values per type of claim under the IVCP. Id. The final model was based on the
average value per claimant across all 19 Diocesan and Religious Order Bankruptcies where a plan
of reorganization was confirmed. Id. Then, for each model, she applied coverage defenses of 0%,
50%, and 100%. All of the model scenarios resulted in projected liability of less than $90 million.
In other words, the insurers are overpaying what they would have to pay if the liability and
coverage issues were litigated.
The $10,230,822.12 Settlement Amount from LMI and the $12,987,274.80 Settlement
Amount from Interstate, which insures only a subset of the 185 POC Abuse Claimants to LMI who
filed before the bar date, totals $23,218,096.92.20 See Doc. 1144 (IE at 0023), ¶¶1-8 and Exhibit
A thereto. That payment is more than LMI’s and Interstate’s liability if the abuse claims are valued
at $90 million even before accounting for their coverage defenses. Comiter Depo. (IE at 0004),
20

These amounts represent only the amounts from LMI and Interstate, and do not include
shares allocable to (i) the Debtor as its SIR or for uncovered UNL, (ii) insurers that covered the
Debtor during other policy periods, and (iii) the 10-20% co-share and the insolvencies on the LMI
Policies. These amounts do not consider the potential damages a claimant may recover from other
defendants, such as a Religious Order or a Boy Scout entity.
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Exhbit 1 at 22. When coverage defenses are accounted for, LMI’s and Interstate’s combined
liability drops to $11.2 million. Id.
Because of the Settlement Agreement, the Insurer Supported Plan would pay $90 million
to 325 POC Abuse Claimants for an average of $276,923 for all claims, or $300,000 when only
POC Abuse Claimants to whom the Debtor may have liability are counted. Comiter Depo. (IE at
0004), Exhibit 1 at 23. This is considerably higher than the $102,222 per claim paid for the 99
settlements from 1990 to 2019, see Comiter Depo. (IE at 0004), Exhibit 1 at 14, and the $114,000
per claim paid in the 71 IVCP settlements.21 Id., at 15. Thus, whether the POC Abuse Claims are
valued at $34.4 million, or $71 million to $86 million, see Scarcella Depo. (IE at 0002), Exhibit 2
at 6; id., 124:15-125:2, LMI’s payment, which is a crucial component of the $90 million paid to
POC under the Insurer Supported Plan, (see Scarcella Depo. (IE at 0002), Exhibits 1 and 2; 46:1218; 48:5-10; 51:22-52:6; 52:25-53:9; 58:13-58:25; 124:3-125:1; 126:16-127:4; 211:22-212:5) is
reasonable.
In comparison, the Diocesan and Religious Order bankruptcies to date paid an average per
claimant payment of $236,000. Comiter Depo. (IE at 0004), Exhibit 1 at 23. The Boy Scouts case
will pay between $30,000 and $40,000 per claim. McNally Depo. (IE at 0003), 57:22-59:13. Ohio
State, which is not in bankruptcy, will pay about $250,000 per claim. Id., 61:18-62:14.
LMI incorporate by reference their objections in their In Limine Motions to Ms. McNally’s
and Mr. Baker’s testimony.

21

LMI learned about the IVCP after it was established and were not involved in the
evaluation or compensation process. LMI received information about the IVCP claims from the
Debtor in July 2021 when it provided charts of IVCP Claims Paid as of September 25, 2020 and
IVCP Claims Pending. LMI responded with a coverage letter dated July 28, 2021. See Ex. 20 to
Sugayan Dec., at LMI001780-LMI001789.
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The Sale Free and Clear Merits Approval.
1.

The Requirements of Bankruptcy Code Section 363(f) are Satisfied.

The sale of the LMI Policies free and clear of all claims and interests including the POC
Abuse Claims merits approval because it satisfies the requirements of Section 363(f).
Section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code permits debtors, with court approval, and subject
to the satisfaction of certain enumerated conditions, to sell assets free and clear of all liens, claims,
interests, charges and encumbrances (with any such liens, claims, interests, charges and
encumbrances attaching to the net proceeds of the sale with the same rights and priorities therein
as in the sold assets).
Section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
The trustee may sell property under subsection (b) or (c) of this section free and
clear of any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate, only if -- (1)
applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and clear of such
interest; (2) such entity consents; (3) such interest is a lien and the price at which
such property is to be sold is greater than the aggregate value of all liens on such
property; (4) such interest is in bona fide dispute; or (5) such entity could be
compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept a money satisfaction of
such interest.
11 U.S.C. §363(f).
Section 363(f) is drafted in the disjunctive, meaning the proposed sale of LMI Policies to
LMI need only satisfy one of the five statutory requirements. Liscinski v. Westgate (In re
Westgate), 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 4297, at *4 (Bankr. D.N.J. Aug. 19, 2008) (citing In re Wolverine
Radio Co., 930 F.2d 1132 (6th Cir. 1991); In re Kellstrom Industries, Inc., 282 B.R. 787, 793
(Bankr. D. Del. 2002)).
Here, the sale satisfies section 363(f) – for several independent reasons: (i) nonbankruptcy
law permits a negotiated settlement “of an insured’s cause of action against its insurer free and
clear of any interest of an injured party whose tort claim would trigger the insurer’s duty to defend
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and indemnify the insured”, see In re Dow Corning Corp., 198 B. R. 214, 245 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1996); (ii) the only entities with an undisputed interest in the Subject Insurance Policies, the
Assureds, have consented to the sale; and (iii) to the extent any POC Abuse Claimant may assert
an interest in the Subject Insurance Policies, such claim is subject to a bona fide dispute; and (iv)
POC Abuse Claimants could be compelled to accept a money satisfaction of their interests (if any)
in the Subject Insurance Policies.
2.

The Claimants’ Contentions That They Have Direct Action Rights
from Which the Debtor Cannot Sell the LMI Policies Free and Clear
Are Without Merit.

None of the POC Abuse Claimants have rights under New Jersey law that prevent the
Debtor from selling the LMI Policies to LMI free and clear.
The POC Abuse Claimants erroneously assert that N.J, Rev. Stat. § 17.28-2 gives them
rights against the LMI Policies that the Debtor cannot divest. They are incorrect. An injured
party’s rights under a policy derive from N.J. Rev. Stat. § 17.28-2. See In re Gardinier's Est., 40
N.J. 261, 265 (1963) (“[O]ur Legislature almost 40 years ago expressed its interest in the subject
by providing for an action by the victim upon the policy after judgment against the insured. R. S.
17:28-2 N.J.S.A. Accordingly, upon the happening of an accident, the injured third party acquires
an interest in the policy…”). However, N.J, Rev. Stat. § 17.28-2 is not a “direct action statute”.
A claimant cannot exercise the interest that it confers prior to obtaining a judgment against the
insured. No POC Abuse Claimant has claims that fit within such a definition. N.J, Rev. Stat. §
17.28-2 states, in pertinent part:
No policy of insurance against loss or damage resulting from accident to or injury
suffered by an employee or other person and for which the person insured is liable,
…, shall be issued or delivered in this state by any insurer authorized to do business
in this state, unless there is contained within the policy a provision that the
insolvency or bankruptcy of the person insured shall not release the insurance
carrier from the payment of damages for injury sustained or loss occasioned during
the life of the policy, and stating that in case execution against the insured is
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returned unsatisfied in an action brought by the injured person … because of the
insolvency or bankruptcy, then an action may be maintained by the injured person,
or his personal representative, against the corporation under the terms of the policy
for the amount of the judgment in the action not exceeding the amount of the policy.
N.J. Stat. § 17:28-2 (emphasis added). “[I]t does not actually ‘authorize’ direct actions. Rather, it
prohibits insurers from contractually disclaiming, in specifically enumerated policy types, an
injured party’s right to sue the insurer for an unsatisfied judgment”. Ferguson v. Travelers Indem.
Co., 2014 WL 3798524, at *7 fn. 9 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 4, 2014. The cases cited by
the POC Abuse Claimants are in accord. See Dransfield v. Citizens Cas. Co. of N. Y., 5 N.J. 190,
194 (1950) (“[T]he injured person has no greater right under the policy than has the assured, he
has ‘a cause of action the moment he is injured’ which ripens into a right of action when he recovers
a judgment against the assured”)(emphasis added); In re Gardinier's Est., 40 N.J. 261, 265, 191
A.2d 294, 296 (1963) (“[O]ur Legislature almost 40 years ago expressed its interest in the subject
by providing for an action by the victim upon the policy after judgment against the insured…”)
(emphasis added); Ferguson, 2014 WL 3798524, at *4 (“an injured third party may not maintain
a ‘direct action’ against the tortfeasor’s insurer until damages have first been fixed by a final
judgment or settlement”).22
Given that no POC Abuse Claimant has a judgment, they cannot bring direct actions against
the Debtor’s insurers.
22

There is a limited exception, inapplicable here, for third-party claimants to seek a
declaration of rights, where the insured party “refused to tender the defense to their insurer”. W.R.
v. K.G., 2021 WL 1259206, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 6, 2021) (see also Smith v.
Frederick Mut. Ins. Co., 2022 WL 73492, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 7, 2022) (finding that the court’s
reasoning in W.R. is not applicable where “the question of whether a party may be compelled to
notify their insurance carrier of [a] legal action” is not raised”.). The analysis in W.R. is
inapplicable here. Courts interpreting New Jersey law consistently find that where a claimant has
not secured a judgment against [the insured] that would confer standing to bring a direct cause of
action against” the insurer, the claims against the insurer “are premature and futile”. See, e.g.,
Vandegrift v. Bowen, 2008 WL 11509911, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2008).
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Even if the POC Abuse Claimants Were to Have Rights in the Policies,
Such Rights Are Interests Subject to a Free and Clear Sale under
363(f).

Section 363(f) permits a debtor to sell property of the estate free and clear of the interest
of any entity in such property. If the purported “direct action” rights of the POC Abuse Claimants
actually were to exist under applicable New Jersey law, then such purported rights are “interests”
as that term is used in Section 363(f), and Section 363(f) would permit the Debtor to sell the LMI
Insurance Policies back to LMI free and clear of such interests.
“Interest” means a “legal share in something; all or part of a legal or equitable claim to or
right in property”. Precision Indus., 327 F.3d at 545 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary, 816 (7th
ed. 1999)) (emphasis added). While the precise contours of “interest” are undefined in the
Bankruptcy Code, the Courts of Appeal that have examined the issue, including the Third Circuit,
agree that if a right is a claim against the debtor or its property, then it is an “interest” in property
subject to Section 363(f). Leckie Smokeless Coal Co., 99 F.3d 573, 582 (4th Cir. 1996); In re
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 322 F.3d 283, 289 (3d Cir. 2003); Precision Indus., 327 F.3d at 545;
In re Motors Liquidation Co., 829 F.3d 135, 155 (2d Cir. 2016).
Thus, any interest in property that can be reduced to a money satisfaction constitutes an
interest for purposes of section 363(f). Folger Adam Sec., Inc. v. DeMatteis/MacGregor, J.V., 209
F.3d 252, 259 (3d Cir. 2000). “Importantly, in the course of our review of Leckie, we noted that
the term any interest is intended to refer to obligations that are connected to, or arise from, the
property being sold”. In re Christ Hosp., 502 B.R. 158, 171 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2013) (citing Folger
Adam, 209 F.3d at 259 (citations omitted).
Therefore, because the POC Abuse Claimants’ imaginary rights in the LMI Policies could,
if they existed, be reduced to a money satisfaction, such rights are interests from which the LMI
policies may be sold free and clear by the Debtor to LMI.
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If the Purported Rights Exist, Then the Settlement Agreement
Adequately Protects Them.

Whatever rights the POC Abuse Claimants may have against the LMI Policies, such rights
are adequately protected by the Settlement Agreement.
Property of the estate may be used or sold free and clear of interests in such property if the
holder of such interest is provided adequate protection. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e); see Folger Adam
Security, Inc. v. Dematteis/Macgregor, JV, 209 F.3d 252, 257 (3d Cir. 2000). The adequate
protection requirement is satisfied if an entity’s interest in property attaches to the proceeds from
the sale or use of the property. See Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d at 94 (emphasis added); see
also In re W.R. Grace & Co., 729 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 2013) (injunction of indemnity and
contribution claims proper only where claims were to be paid from trust); see Ray v. Norseworthy,
90 U.S. 128, 134-35 (1874); S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5787, 5842 (committee report on 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)) (“Most
often, adequate protection in connection with a sale free and clear of other interests will be to have
those interests attach to the proceeds of the sale”.)
The Settlement Agreement and Section 363 provide that the interests of the POC Abuse
Claimants in the LMI Policies, if any, attach to the proceeds paid by LMI pursuant to the
Settlement Agreement. Hence, the Debtor may sell the LMI Policies to LMI free and clear of such
interests, if any exist.
E.

The Settlement Agreement is not a Sub Rosa Plan.

On January 20, 2022, in a letter to the Court, the Committee made the unfounded and
unsupported contention that the Settlement Agreement is a sub rosa plan. Letter to Hon. Jerrold
N. Poslusny re: Application in Support of Setting Schedule of Pending Matters and Order
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Shortening Time Pursuant to Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 9006(c)(1); Doc. 1122. That
contention is incorrect.
“Settlement agreements which dispose of all claims against the estate, restrict creditors'
right to vote as they see fit on a proposed Chapter 11 plan, or dispose of substantially all of a
debtor's assets have been found to constitute improper sub rosa plans”. In re Nortel Networks,
Inc., 522 B.R. 491, 508 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014).
To the contrary, in Nortel Networks, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court held that the
settlement agreement was not a sub rosa plan, because funds could only be paid to claimants
according to the terms of a confirmed chapter 11 Plan. Id. “On the other hand, a settlement
agreement which is a necessary step toward, or building block of, a plan of reorganization does
not constitute in improper sub rosa plan”. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Similar to Nortel, here, the Settlement Agreement, which ultimately resolves the Adversary
Proceeding and provides for a $30 million insurance contribution to be made by the Certain
Settling Insurers is an essential first step in confirming the Plan. Moreover, where, as here, a
settlement will be implemented only “in accordance with a confirmed chapter 11 plan” and parties
in interest are provided with a full opportunity to vote on such plan, the settlement does not
constitute a sub rosa plan. Nortel Networks, 522 B.R. at 508-09.
In In re Marvel Ent. Grp., Inc., 222 B.R. 243, 251 (D. Del. 1998), the Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Delaware held that a settlement was not a sub rosa plan, because, as here, the
settlement agreement was contingent upon confirmation and consummation of a chapter 11 plan.
“In fact, the entire Settlement is contingent upon subsequent confirmation and consummation of
the Toy Biz plan. All parties will still have the opportunity to litigate the details of the
reorganization plan, and to explain to the court why they believe the plan is not confirmable. Thus,
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the court finds that the Settlement is not a sub rosa plan”. Id. The same is true here because the
transactions contemplated by the Settlement Agreement are all contingent upon the confirmation
of the Plan, which will be subject to all applicable confirmation standards under section 1129 of
the Bankruptcy Code. See Settlement Agreement (IE at 0013), e.g., Art. 2 and 4 specifying
payment only after a confirmation order is final, and making the releases effective upon receipt of
payment by the Trust, Accordingly, approval of the Settlement Agreement will not impair the
rights of POC Abuse Claimants, or any other constituency, to raise any issues in connection with
confirmation of an Insurer Supported Plan. The Settlement Agreement in no way qualifies as a
sub rosa plan.
Lastly, to the extent the Committee or any other party in interest objects to the prospect of
a channeling injunction or third party releases for the benefit of non-debtor entities, any such
protections would be effectuated through confirmation of an Insurer Supported Plan.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant the 9019 Motion and approve the

Settlement Agreement.
Dated: September 23, 2022

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Sommer L. Ross
Sommer L. Ross (NJ No. 004112005)
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CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE
I, Sommer L. Ross, hereby certify under penalty of perjury the following:
1.

I am an attorney at Duane Morris LLP and am co-counsel to Certain

Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, Catalina Worthing Insurance Ltd f/k/a HFPI (as Part VII
transferee of Excess Insurance Company Ltd. and London & Edinburgh Insurance Company
Ltd.), RiverStone Insurance (UK) Ltd. (as successor in interest to Terra Nova Insurance
Company Ltd), and Sompo Japan Nipponkoa Insurance Company of Europe Limited (f/k/a/
The Yasuda Fire & Marine Insurance Company of Europe Ltd.) (collectively “London Market
Insurers” or “LMI”) in the above-captioned case (“Chapter 11 Case”).
2.

On September 23, 2022, I caused a true and correct copy of the following

documents to be filed in the Chapter 11 Case on behalf of LMI:
TRIAL BRIEF OF LONDON MARKET INSURERS IN SUPPORT OF THE
DEBTOR’S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER APPROVING
SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERSY BY AND AMONG THE DIOCESE AND
THE SETTLING INSURERS PURSUANT TO RULE 9019
3.

On September 23, 2022, the aforementioned document filed was served via the

Court’s CM/ECF system upon all parties registered to receive notice in the Chapter 11 Case as
well as by email to the following:
mark.pfeiffer@bipc.com; ad@djd.law; jedelstein@edelsteinlaw.com;
hweintraub@lawjw.com; david.inscho@klinespecter.com; kurtzman@kurtzmansteady.com;
baldante@levybaldante.com; kfriedrichs@lockslaw.com; jprol@lowenstein.com;
bweisenberg@lowenstein.com; mpapandrea@lowenstein.com; cmaker@lowenstein.com;
krosen@lowenstein.com; jauddino@marinoassociates.net; wjmartin@martingunn.com;
JBernstein@mdmc-law.com; rtrenk@trenkisabel.law; rroglieri@trenkisabel.law;
mal@njlegal.com; mac@njlegal.com; mmerson@mersonlaw.com;
jeffrey.m.sponder@usdoj.gov; lauren.bielskie@usdoj.gov; hpogust@pogustmillrood.com;
gmagee@pogustmillrood.com; camdenteam@primeclerk.com; serviceqa@primeclerk.com;
JMascolo@ram.law; ethansheffet@gmail.com; dcedar@williamscedar.com;
aabramowitz@shermansilverstein.com; jkulback@archerlaw.com;
michael.jones@rivkin.com; Siobhain.Minarovich@rivkin.com; charles.jones@lawmoss.com;
wjmartin@pbnlaw.com; raparisi@pbnlaw.com; jsmairo@pbnlaw.com;
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bluckman@shermansilverstein.com; mark.sheridan@squirepb.com;
mark.errico@squirepb.com; tschiavoni@omm.com; jpanchok-berry@omm.com;
Damien.Tancredi@flastergreenberg.com; jschwartz@riker.com; mrossignol@riker.com;
jschwartz@riker.com; mrossignol@riker.com; dbanker@mmwr.com;
eschnitzer@mmwr.com; eperkins@becker.legal; llovett@hermanlaw.com;
jtesta@mccarter.com; rswitkes@shermansilverstein.com; dleney@archerlaw.com;
jk@seidmanllc.com; jmascolo@ram.law; michael@pcvalaw.com; jason@pcvalaw.com;
asherman@sillscummis.com; steele@sillscummis.com; gkopacz@sillscummis.com;
Harry.Giacometti@flastergreenberg.com; 'cabreu@hermanlaw.com';
adam@adamhorowitzlaw.com; gmagee@pgmbm.us; 'hwinsberg@phrd.com'; Matt M. Weiss
<mweiss@phrd.com>; psmith@djdlawyers.com; phughes@dilworthlaw.com;
dcampbell@ghclaw.com; mpolitan@politanlaw.com; dan@fasylaw.com;
bsmith@tamakilaw.com; Joseph@blumellaw.com; stamoulis@swdelaw.com;
filings@swdelaw.com; weinblatt@swdelaw.com; michael.kotula@rivkin.com;
mtrentin@coleschotz.com; sdarling@trenkisabel.law; dana.augustine@injurylawyer.com;
Kaplan, Michael A. <MKaplan@lowenstein.com>; Bennett, Lynda A.
<LBennett@lowenstein.com>; patrick.omea@rivkin.com; jk@seidmanllc.com; Jeremiah
Atkins <JAtkins@hoffmandimuzio.com>; kbhattacharya@benditweinstock.com;
patrick.omea@rivkin.com; rchahil@lowenstein.com;
rtrenk@trenkisabel.law; rroglieri@trenkisabel.law; jprol@lowenstein.com; Weisenberg,
Brent <BWeisenberg@lowenstein.com>; Kaplan, Michael A. <MKaplan@lowenstein.com>;
Restel, Colleen <crestel@lowenstein.com>; raparisi@pbnlaw.com; jsmairo@pbnlaw.com;
Arthur J. Abramowitz <AAbramowitz@shermansilverstein.com>; 'Tancredi, Damien'
<Damien.Tancredi@flastergreenberg.com>; Sponder, Jeffrey M. (USTP
<Jeffrey.M.Sponder@usdoj.gov>; Bielskie, Lauren (USTP <Lauren.Bielskie@usdoj.gov>;
Judge Michael Hogan <judge@hoganmediation.net>; dmcgill@webbermcgill.com; Siobhain
P. Minarovich <Siobhain.Minarovich@rivkin.com>; Michael Jones
<michael.jones@rivkin.com>; Peter.McNamara@Rivkin.com; Harris Winsberg
<hwinsberg@phrd.com>; Matt M. Weiss <mweiss@phrd.com>; Todd C. Jacobs
(tjacobs@bradleyriley.com); John E. Bucheit <jbucheit@bradleyriley.com>;
mark.errico@squirepb.com; mark.sheridan@squirepb.com; Hinker, Matthew
<mhinker@omm.com>; Schiavoni, Tancred <tschiavoni@omm.com>;
stamoulis@swdelaw.com; Joseph Schwartz <JSCHWARTZ@RIKER.com>; Michael J.
Rossignol <mrossignol@riker.com>; Tara Schellhorn <tschellhorn@riker.com>;
dbanker@mmwr.com; PSmith@djdlawyers.com; jeff@andersonadvocates.com;
phughes@dilworthlaw.com; BKent@laffeybuccikent.com; psochanchak@lunddylaw.com;
Lsimon@dalton.law; Bdalton@dalton.law; cdalton@dalton.law; mark.pfeiffer@bipc.com;
bharkavy@jjsjustice.com; David.inscho@klinespecter.com;
Lorraine.donnelly@klinespecter.com; philip.pasquarello@klinespecter.com;
rdressel@lexnovalaw.com; baldante@levybaldante.com; jk@seidmanllc.com;
jmascolo@ram.law; michael@pcvalaw.com; jason@pcvalaw.com
Dated: September 23, 2022

/s/ Sommer L. Ross
Sommer L. Ross
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